“Daddy” killed NATO
We all need to just move on
In recent weeks I have had various engagements with former members of the UK defence establishment, former ministers and think tankers close to the UK defence establishment discussing the state of Special Relationship with the U.S., and particularly where it relates to defence.
Now herein critics, or realists (including yours truly), would suggest that the special relationship, and NATO itself is dead or, if not, on life support. This follows stinging criticism by the U.S. of perennial underspending on defence by NATO partners, and of them failing to be there at the U.S. hours of need - and particularly now in the US & Israeli war on Iran. From a European perspective there is also frustration at the US not appearing to take European interests seriously, as seen by the US scaling back and now charging for the support it gives to Ukraine, and then Donald Trump’s threats to take other NATO members’ territory - specifically Greenland from Denmark, and even Canada. They would argue that allies do not threaten the use of force, or coercion, to take territory from their allies.
For many non U.S. NATO members the charge that they have not been there for the US is particularly galling after many shed much blood, and much treasure, after 911 in supporting failed US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of the U.K. the fact that it spent so much on those failed wars can to an extent explain the dire state of
UK defences now - I would add disastrous risk assessment& long term defence planning, procurement, and over ambitious defence goals.
Against this backdrop I was surprised to still hear the U.K. defence establishment adopt a still rosy, or glass half full, view of the U.K. - US defence relationship. The message seems to be that the U.K. - US special relationship runs deep, as it was forged in blood on numerous battlefields over the past century or so, and will outlast the short term travails of the current Trump presidency. A similar line was presented over the outlook for NATO - it’s not dead yet, and let’s bunker down until the next U.S. presidency when surely the advantages of NATO - as they like to term it the most succesful defensive alliance in history - will again be understood by the next US leadership.
The other line in defence of NATO, from the UK, and I think European perspective, as reflected in the words of NATO Secretary General, Rutte, is that the U.K. and Europe simply cannot survive or defend themselves without the US backstop - as was seen in the U.K.-French led intervention in Libya, but which only “succeeded” because Obama was eventually persuaded to backstop the endeavour. They would argue that the alliance with the US allows the U.K. and others to still punch above their weight on the global scale because of the critical support from the U.S., including intelligence, heavy lifting/logistics, air defence, et al. For the U.K., in particular, our defence automomy from the US remains hamstrung by our dependency on the US to provide and service the tomahawk missiles that carry our ‘indepenent’ nuclear deterrent, and the U.S. F35s which still fly off our two aircraft carriers, while the U.K. has been unable to provide the finance to provide the full compliment of U.K. jets. Why we decided to go for two white elephant aircraft carriers we cannot afford to man, or escort, is beyond me but explained the defence failures identified above.
It is complicated because of the truly disastrous decisions around defence made in the over ambitious defence strategies ( trying to do too much with Global Britain as opposed to just Defending Britain) past - not clearly understanding the risks to the U.K. and Europe, often not adequately explaining these to our populations, so not spending enough on defence, and then building in too much reliance and dependency on the US. All this has taken us to a point where for the UK, at least, I think part of the warm words over special relationship is that while there is an understanding that the U.S. and UK’s national security interests and core values may no longer dovetail, we are just too impregnated by the U.S. defence establishment to disentangle these without compromising our core defence in the short term.
In trying to justify clinging on to the US - UK special relationship I also heard reference to the fact that we shluld focus still on our joint interests remaining. I would question do we still have any left under Trump presidency. And herein it is now surely clear with the war now in Iran, the decapitation operation in Venezuela, a similar operation likely in Cuba, territorial claims to Canada and Greenland, Trump talking about deals with Russia, that U.S. and UK, European core security interests are not closely aligned. For the U.K., and Europe the number one - by far - existential threat is Russia. And yet Trump talks about business deals and sanctions moderation for Russia. For the U.K. and Europe, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and China are low on the list of pressing national security risks. But China is obviously number one for the US, of whatever huw of administration. Clearly also Iran, and defending Israel, are high priorities for the US. But they are low risks/interests for the U.K. and Europe. Well, until in the latter case the Trump administration decided to embark on it’s catastrophic war with Iran. Actually this is a case of where US interests actually aggressively work against UK or European interests, as the U.S. intervention has set a fire under the Gulf, boosted oil prices and disrupted supply chains, threatening the stability of the global economy much more to the detriment of energy importing Europe, than the energy exporting US. Higher oil prices have also helped Russia, by filling its coffers and enabling it to wage its war on Ukraine, and Europe, longer. The US is now whinging about the fact that NATO allies have not rushed to support the US endeavour, but why should they when this intervention works exactly against their interests. And why should other non NATO allies put their troops lives on the line, to become an enemy and target of Iran? The US never asked its allies’ opinions on the war - they had no input in the decision so why would they now feel compelled to make an input to the war effort?
Even on the idea of common values, I would doubt that most European leaders would support Trump’s threats of genocide against Iran, and to conduct war crimes, against Iran. Or the Trump’s administration’s support of far right, extremist forces in Europe - EDL leader Tommy Robinson was even a recent guest at the State Department. And many of the tweets, or “truths”, of Trump now appear xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic, and suggest a White Christian Supremacist agenda. Is that where the U.K. and Europe now is? Opinion polls in the U.K. still show a near 60-40 split between centre/centre left and liberal parties versus the right, and extreme right. Public opinion rejects Trump’s values in the UK and Europe.
I would contend that the U.S. and Europe and the U.K. are now miles apart on both interests and values, and clinging to the idea that something will change at the next US election, or that we have no choice but to hang on to the current alliance as long as possible in the hope that something will turn in the US, is just very wishful - actually no damning right dangerous - thinking.
It does rather remind me of the scene from the U.K. movie Carry on up the Kyber, where a bunch of toff British colonial officers try to maintain the stiff upper lip of mainting their exposure at dinner while their troops hold off an overwhelming onslaught by the enemies of the time outside their dining mess. Eventually victory is ensured though by thinking outside the box, or kilt, for those who know the movie, and indeed, I would be in favour showing Donald Trump what lies behind the kilt. Telling Trump where to get off, and maybe he would TACO even on this issue.
Indeed, I would argue that a better strategy would be to be open about the rift in NATO Rutte, rather than calling Trump “Daddy”, should confront him and make Trump own the fact that he is killing NATO. Does Trump really want to be the POTUS that killed the greatest defence alliance in history? And pushing allies, to boot, into the arms of China. And if Trump does not like it, and threatens us with tariffs well we should learn from China, and TACO and go head to head with Trump in a tariff war, as he would inevitably back off if his beloved S&P dropped. We should avoid another Turnburry calamity, where Europe simply soiled its pants and waved the White Flag, took an assymetric tariff deal to buy Trump off on NATO, which spectacularly failed. As with all bullies, Trump took the bribe of lower tariffs and asked for more on NATO.
Instead we should explain that not only will Trump be responsible for the end of NATO but Europe will move away from writing big cheques for US military kit and will absolutely not be there for the US if we end up seeing a final hegemonic clash between the US and China. But we would, if the U.S. respected European interests again on NATO and on European interests in supporting Ukraine and countering Russia.
But we should in the interim fast track the development of an autonomous (from the US) defence. We need to imagine the worst - that NATO is dead, and the U.S. backstop is not there, as all these fairy tales that the US - UK, or NATO special relationship is still there just creates a false sense of security, and means we don’t still spend enough on our own defence, and we do move fast enough to secure our own autonomous defence.
So can Europe defend itself against the existential Russian threat without the U.S.?
I think it can but we have to think outside the box (under the kilt), and look to broaden the European alliance.
First, things first, Ukraine is now the strongest military force in Europe, with the exception of Russia. Ukraine, through innovation and bravery has stopped a far more numerical military force. It’s capabilities in drones are now world leading - and the wars in Ukraine and Gulf War III has shown how drones have changed the nature of warfare. Ukraine can help Europe train to defend itself much better and with fewer resources. But we need to institutionalise the Ukrainian defence relationship with Europe while Ukraine still has an interest.
Second, Türkiye, is a close military peer to Ukraine, and has scale in terms of its troop numbers (400,000 regular, 300,000 reserve), and its drone and military industrial complex. Like Ukraine, Türkiye is battle hardened, and experienced in warfare. But Europe needs to put past prejudices behind it and reach out for deeper defence cooperation with Türkiye if is going to be able to counter the existential threat from Russia without the U.S. backstop. Türkiye can provide the manufacturing scale to immediately moon shot European defence capability - but needs financing and technology exchange.
Third, Poland, now is spending big time on defence (close to 6% of GDP) and will be increasingly armed with new (much South Korean) and effective kit, plus it has a large and motivated army.
Fourth, Finland brought enormous military capability to European NATO, with 1 million or so trained regular/irregular troops, and particular experience and motivation in fighting Russia. It has significant long range strike capability.
Fifth, Germany is finally understanding of the threats from Russia, and the fact the U.S. is AWOL - even a threat. It is now spending big time on defence and its huge and powerful industrial complex will soon retool to defence. Give Germany 3-5 years and it can fill many of the gaps left by the U.S., but its deep fiscal pockets will allow others to accelerate the defence transition.
Add in the military institutional memories, or DNA, and defence tech capabilities of the UK and France, if not the treasure, but then with the additional spending power of the Scandies/Nordics, and Europe should absolutely be able to counter and stop the Russian threat.
Important I think though is Europe understanding the specific prime threat - Russia - and the likes of the U.K., France, Italy perhaps not getting sidelined by broader defence ambitions. Russia is the threat and the question is how do we defend the U.K.’s shores and Europe against that specific threat. Surely with a population four times the size of Russia, and a combined GDP perhaps fifteen times, Europe can get its act together and fill the void left by the U.S. But critically I think we need to cast off the feint hopes still that the U.S. still shares the same interests or values, or if not now will mean revert very shortly. No, what happens if it does not? We have to assume the worst, and plan for that now. If we don’t then the U.K. and Europe will be on the menu in the Great Power World seemingly craved now by Trump, Putin and Xi.

European and UK defence expansion is fundamentally hindered by Public/Voter Education, Welfare prioritisation, and Democratic cycles.
This centres on a "trilemma" of competing domestic pressures.
Long-term sustainability faces these three systemic barriers:
1. The Education and Perception Gap
A primary threat to sustained defence expansion is the lack of public understanding regarding modern security requirements.
• The "Peace Dividend" Mindset: Decades of relative stability have led to a population that views military spending as a relic of the past rather than a current necessity.
• Misunderstanding Threat Modernity: There is often a disconnect between public perception and the reality of gray-zone warfare, cyber threats, and the industrial mass required for conventional deterrence.
• Inconsistent Support: While support for military spending in the UK reached record levels in 2025 (40% in favour vs. 20% against), only 9% of the population view it as the top priority for extra spending. This suggests that support is "shallow" and easily eroded when other domestic needs arise.
2. The "Welfare vs. Warfare" Addiction
European states face a structural "welfare-to-weapons" crisis where entrenched social spending makes fiscal pivots to defence politically explosive.
Crowding Out: Advanced European economies are projected to face spending pressures of up to 5.7% of GDP by 2050 due to aging populations and climate goals. This leaves little "fiscal space" for the 3%–5% GDP defence targets now being discussed by NATO.
Fiscal Barriers: In the UK, the "ambition" to reach 3% of GDP is strictly subject to "economic and fiscal conditions," essentially subordinating national security to immediate budgetary health.
Debt Constraints: With 17 EU members already exceeding debt and deficit benchmarks, any major defence hike often requires unpopular tax increases or cuts to the social safety net.
3. The Short-Termism of Democratic Mandates
Democratic election cycles are inherently ill-suited for the multi-decade timelines required for defence procurement.
• Procurement vs. Polls: Major defence projects (like nuclear submarines or new fighter jets) span decades, but political mandates rarely exceed five years. This leads to a pattern of "start-stop" funding and "glacial delivery".
• Political Hazards: Governments often fear that long-term military investments will be viewed by voters as "corporate handouts" rather than public goods.
• Lack of Insulated Funding: Unlike the UK’s nuclear enterprise, most conventional military funding is not insulated from changes in government, leading to "damaging in-year budget cycles" that prevent long-term industrial planning.
I do very much agree with you. European countries must work together and be able to defend ourselves.