Educating Nigel Farage

If that is even possible

It was extraordinary, and sad, in recent days to hear the musings, or rather rants, of Nigel Farage, on the war in Ukraine and the jibe that the West somehow provoked Russia to invade Ukraine by pushing for Ukrainian membership of NATO and the EU.

Farage might know his way around the bar of the Dulwich village golf club, but it does not appear as though he knows very much at all about Ukraine or Russia.

His views on Russia and Ukraine bear no resemblance to reality and appear more as Putin’s talking points, which still raises doubts in my mind over the allegations of Russian funding for Brexit.

I might speak herein from a position of some knowledge, having covered Russia and Ukraine as a professional analyst for more than 35 years, having lived in Ukraine, and

Russia, and written over 1,000 published pieces on this very subject in publications such as the Kyiv Post, Kyiv independent and for Chatham House, CEPA, et al. See this blog also for plenty of “track record”.

So setting the record straight.

First, on this idea, or urban myth, that NATO somehow promised no further enlargement to Ukraine after its first wave of enlargement to the likes of Poland, Hungary, et al. I know Moscow likes to push that narrative but there is no evidence in fact that any such promise was made. Indeed, before his death, former Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, affirmed that there was no such promise.

Yet even if there was, should any such policy be set in stone and when it comes to NATO’s security? As the former British politician, Harald MacMillan quipped when asked what was the biggest challenge he faced as prime minister, he replied, “events my dear boy, events”. Times change, and policy needs to adapt and adjust as a result and needs must in terms of national security. And I note that Moscow itself was pretty quick to walk away from the assurance, written on paper, as the Budapest Memorandum, made to Ukraine in 1994, that in exchange for Ukraine agreeing to give up its nuclear weapons, Moscow would guarantee its sovereignty. Those same nuclear weapons would surely have deterred Russia from annexing Crimea in 2014, invading Donbas in the same year, and then the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin did not keep to his word, he invaded Ukraine. He was, and is, the aggressor.

Second, on NATO enlargement, the reality is in 2013, the year before Putin annexed Crimea and invaded Donbas, Ukraine had no real intent, or perspective to join NATO, and Putin knew that. In 2013 opinion polls showed single digit support for NATO membership in Ukraine, and insufficient to have approved any such membership in a referendum as would have been required. Most

Ukrainians were instead content with the country’s non aligned status. Opinion only changed in Ukraine after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas in 2014 as Ukrainians realised that non aligned status was no defence against Russian aggression and colonialisation. Even in NATO there was no willingness to accept Ukraine as a member, for fear therein of provoking Russia, as was also seen with foot dragging also over NATO membership for Georgia which actually had strong public support for membership after

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008.

Ukraine had no NATO perspective in 2014, or even in 2022, and Putin’s vast intelligence network knew that.

On the annexation of Crimea specifically though, a narrative is sold, by Farage et al, that Putin’s annexation was somehow defensive, as NATO was about to somehow take Sebastopol as a naval base. Again, complete bull. Russia took Crimea in a matter of hours, as Russia had legal (long term lease agreed with Ukraine in 2009 for the base) and defacto (29,000 troops already stationed in Crimea) control over the peninsula. Ukraine, and NATO, had no ability to defend Crimea. Where was the offensive threat? Indeed, as the war in Donbas in 2014 proved Ukraine barely had the ability to defend itself, let alone attack Russia.

But surely successive rounds of NATO expansion have made Russia feel insecure? Poor Russia.

Well NATO has expanded but each wave of expansion has seen NATO spend less on defence - from 3% of GDP in 1991, to something like 1.5% in 2013. Note that in the year before the annexation of Crimea, the US withdrew its last tank from Europe, and total U.S. troop numbers in Europe were in the few thousands, not the hundreds of thousands at the peak of the Cold War. The UK army was down to its lowest level since before WW1, and Germany had cut the number of main battle tanks from a peak of 2000 in 1991 to 178, most of which did not work. Where was this offensive NATO capability and the threat to Russia? Rather NATO would have struggled to defend Europe against a Russian invasion, had the Ukrainians not been able to provide a critical line of defence for us. And where is the evidence of NATO encroachment anywhere on Russian territory? Nowhere, but instead we see Russia expanding to steal other countries’s territory from Transdniestr, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Crimea, Donbas, then the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Adding in herein that actually Russia used WMD twice on NATO territory with the Litvinenko and Skrypal cases, for which NATO did little in response.

The reality is NATO expansion made Europe more, not less secure, and it has been Russia that has been the biggest threat to European security which explains the long queue of countries still wanting to join, and the recent change in view of entrenched neutrals like Sweden and

Finland.

Third, ok surely the prospect of EU expansion to Ukraine was a direct threat to Russia, surely that was reason for Russia to invade Ukraine?

Well, the EU still has no real military capability, so hard to see that as a threat to Russia.

I do get though that EU expansion to Ukraine, if successful, could have provided Ukraine as an example for Russians, of a successful economy, democracy with humans rights and rule of law. Surely that would be a threat to Putin’s corrupt kleptocracy and now fascist state.

But first, in 2013 Ukraine still had no clear EU membership perspective, the EU only willing to sign an association and trade agreement. This was not a green light to membership, which Ukrainians knew to their frustration and Russians to their glee.

Many argue that Ukraine should not have been granted EU accession status, as their ideal role would be a bridge between east and West. The harsh reality is that that was the status quo for Ukraine for the thirty years since independence and it had not advanced the country economically, meaning that the social and political situation was actually not sustainable. By way of example I always use the example that in 1991, upon the collapse of the USSR, Russian, Polish and Ukrainian GDP were all around $3000 per capita, but by 2013, Russia and Poland had advanced to $14,000 per capita but Ukraine’s was stuck at $3000. Why? Poland had the EU accession anchor, Russia the commodity backstop, while Ukraine was maintained in this twilight zone between Russia and the EU, where there was no rule of law, and corrupt Kremlin linked oligarchs extracted rent from the country’s natural resources as agents of

Moscow. Ukraine was a colony in effect still of Russia, and subject to colonial exploitation. But the situation was not sustainable as the population wanted something different - they saw development in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, et al, and wanted the same rule of law and human rights. The result was two revolutions, the Orange revolution of 2004/05 and then the Euromaydan of 2013/14, and if the latter had not succeeded we would have seen further periodic revolutions in Ukraine, and instability and insecurity, as the country was not working for the bulk of the population aside from Putin’s corrupt cronies like Yanukovych and Medvedchuk.

Ukrainians wanted change, they wanted to pull out of Russia’s colonial orbit and that is ultimately why Putin intervened, as a colonial power that could not accept the loss of its Empire. As Timothy Snyder argues, Russia, as the UK, France, Portugal, Spain et al before it just has to get over its past imperial glories and move on. Russia needs to be defeated now in Ukraine to be able to move on itself.

Notable here in this idea of poor old Russia, in that we don’t see any of the other states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as feeling the need to invade other countries. It is Russia that is the aggressor - even internally as seen in Putin’s brutal suppression, even cleansing of Chechnya soon after assuming office, which can also be seen thru the same colonialisation prism.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and invaded Donbas later in that year, and then tried a full scale invasion in 2022, as Putin saw the opportunity for a territorial land grab, while never really accepting of Ukrainian independence and identity (read the essay he wrote in mid 2021 for evidence of his views therein). The opportunity was presented by Western weakness and appeasement and Ukraine’s own political, social and economic instability which had been prior cultivated by Russia - Moscow had actively sought to weaken and undermine Ukraine, often from within with agents like Yanukovych and Medvedchuk.

Mr Farage, your mate Putin is a tin pot, fascist colonialist. He is not to be admired in any way. Indeed, this “genius” you so admire has pulled Russia into a long (2.5 years) war that it now cannot win, that has cost half a million Russian dead and injured, a trillion dollar of losses to the

Russian economy, and the reduction in Russia’s global status to the point that Putin has to go grovelling to North Korea and Iran for munitions, because it’s “partner” China will not provide them for fear of annoying the US. Russia is now the runt of the Chinese litter, and dependent on China. Some strategic genius - it is only remarkable that Farage some how looks up to Putin, despite his dimunuiative character. I think this says as much about Farage, as Putin.