Kofman gets it spot on here. Top US based analyst of the Russian military.
https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/putins-wager-in-russias-standoff-with-the-west/
People who understand Putin - Fiona Hill - and the Russian military - Kofman - think Putin goes in.
I understand the Russian economy - and I think in building Fortress Russia policy settings, which I first coined back in 2015, Putin has been preparing for this moment since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea:
* $630bn in FX reserves;
* Low public debt burden, less than 20% of GDP;
* Much reduced external debt burden also at less than 25% of GDP:
* Large current account surplus, 7% of GDP last year, external financing surplus.
* Small fiscal deficit/close to balance this year;
* A flexible exchange rate, inflation targeting and super respected central bank seen as well able to manage a period of FX volatility;
* Solid banking sector, liquid, well capitalised and profitable and not overly reliant on international capital markets.
The Russian macro is better able than at any time over past 30 years to ride thru instability caused by a major war.
That is not to suggest any such conflict would be painless for the Russian economy. Sanctions would subdue capital inflows into Russia, increase the cost of capital, reduce investment and slow growth. This would further the stagnation of the Russian economy seen since 2011 with the lack of structural reform and the poor business environment (corruption, red tape, bureaucracy and sanctions) stalling potential growth. Living standards for ordinary Russians will further decline. The risk of social unrest will increase but Putin will think that his recent tightening up on the opposition and the recent crack down on demonstrations in Kazakhstan and Belarus, will deter any such unrest. He will also calculate that a military win in Ukraine will make Russians feel better about the state of the country, even if their own living standards are getting worse. So Putin will likely think that any economic hit is manageable.