Incumbency just sucks

The re-election of Donald Trump for a second term in the US had seemed to be a clarion call for a structural political shift towards similarly populist, MAGA style movements across Europe. The assumption had perhaps been that it would blow wind in the sails of the likes of the AfD in Germany, FN in France, and bringing even greater support and momentum for incumbent populists, or illiberal Democrats, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary, Robert Fico in Slovakia et al.

Actually what we are seeing is a somewhat mixed picture across Europe, and actually with many of Trump’s apostles being on the back foot.

The Afd in Germany and FN in France do appear to be on a roll if not, necessarily, yet in the ascendency - and expected to improve their positions in the next elections, the AfD more imminent in March. The success of the nationalist candidate, Calin Georgescu, in the first round of presidential elections in Romania late last year also perhaps played to this narrative of populists on the rise. The second round of the Romanian presidential poll was subsequently cancelled amid claims of foreign interference in favour of Georgescu. But opinion polls still show Georgescu as the most likely winner in repeat elections set for May, that is if Georgescu is not barred from running.

But elsewhere the picture for illiberal democrats/nationalists is not quite so encouraging.

In Hungary, Trump’s number one European best buddy, Victor Orban, has seen the popularity of his ruling Fidesz party eclipsed by a new entrant, led by a former Orban acolyte Peter Magyar. Magyar broke from Fidesz, formed a new party, Tisza, and launched a campaign against Orban, focused on exposing alleged corruption by his former boss and Fidesz. The campaign appears to have hit a chord with the electorate as has Magyar’s pitch for better relations with the EU and, importantly, a message that he can free up important EU structural funds to kick start the currently moribund Hungarian economy. And the economy does seem to be caught in a crisis of confidence, with a huge question mark now over the business model of Orban inc - driven by FDI (much of which is Chinese) into the manufacturing sector, particularly into the auto sector with a focus on export driven growth, and fuelled by cheap Russian energy. As elsewhere in Central Europe - in Germany too - that model is in crisis given dumping of cheap imports from China, and an oversupply of EV capacity globally, plus obviously massive hikes in energy import prices as a result of the war in Ukraine. Opinion polls suggest that Orban could well lose the election in 2025, seeing his current 14 year stint in office come to a close.

In neighbouring Slovakia the shine on Robert Fico’s 2023 election victory has been short lived. Mass street demonstrations over a spectrum of popular concerns, particularly over Fico’s overly close relations with Vladimir Putin, a deterioration in relations with Europe, corruption and kleptocracy has seen Fico’s majority in Parliament evaporate. Slovakia has a similar business model to Hungary, which is facing the same challenges - weak auto sector demand, plus a loss of cheap Russian energy. Slovak is grappling with the loss of key Russian gas exports and

Fico’s solution seems to has been to engage in a war of words with President Zelensky in Ukraine, which likely will only deteriorate relations with Europe. This will just further polarise opinion at home and Fico might well face early elections, which he could lose.

Like Orban, Vucic has had a long uninterrupted stint in office in Serbia dating back to 2011. Capable management of Serbia’s macro economy, underpinned by success in attracting FDI (again much of which is from China), and Vucic’s success in dominating key institutions of power - media, big business, judiciary, et al, has delivered a succesful track record in elections, with win after win for Vucic and his nationalist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in presidential, parliamentary and local elections. Vucic has been helped by a weak and divided opposition. But recent months have seen popular street protests rock the regime - first around environmental concerns over proposed lithium mining, and most recently by a scandal around the collapse of a roof at the Novy Sad railway station which left fifteen dead and many injured. The demonstrations have alleged mismanagement and corruption and called for regime change. Vucic has sought to head off the protests by promising cabinet changes, and even this week what seems to have been the sacrifice of his prime minister, Milos Vucevic. Vucevic had been Mayor of Novy Sad at the time renovation work conducted by a Chinese company began on the railway station in that town. Vucic has been here before, riding through numerous prior periods of street demonstrations - a section of the population feel alienated from the political process which to them at least appears stitched up by Vucic. Vucic will likely go back to what has worked for him in the past - repeat elections - which if past form is anything to go by, and given the power still of patronage and his control over the state media, he will more likely than not win. But street demonstrations feels a little different this time, and their potential mismanagement by the authorities - recent violence against demonstrators by SNS supporters - could perhaps risk an upset at the polls.

And in Georgia the nationalist, socially illiberal, Georgia Dream government of the oligarch ‘king behind the throne’, Bidini Ivanishvilli, has this year been similarly rocked by street demonstrations - with a large section of the population upset by what they view as rigged elections last year and an apparent shift away from EU accession plans towards better ties with Moscow. It is unclear what the outcome of the battle between street demonstrators - now going on for more than two months - and the incumbent GD government will be. As with Vucic in Serbia, and perhaps Fico in Slovakia, much will depend on how these demonstrations are managed. Any excessive use of force could see the momentum in the country shift away from the incumbents - rather as they did during the Euromaydan protests in Ukraine in late 2013. The deciding factor in Ukraine seemed to have been the decision of the then Yanukovych regime to resort to violence from November 2013 onwards, ultimately culminating in lethal force being used on demonstrators in February 2013, and the rest is history.

Summing the above up, I think the common message across European politics is not of a shift globally to a MAGA style populist/illiberal agenda - as Trump and his supporters might claim - but actually a defeat for incumbents as populations rail against ineffective government and a failure to address core issues like the cost of living crisis. We have seen defeat for incumbents pretty much across the board in elections over the last year - in the U.K., US, New Zealand, Turkey (local elections), Poland, South Africa, even Modi in India, likely soon in Canada, Germany and perhaps in Serbia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. In Georgia the incumbent GD did win elections last year but the fairness of that poll is disputed by the opposition. The one election which could buck the trend is presidential elections in Poland due by May, where the ruling (government) Civic Platform candidate is topping the polls, albeit this would topple the Justice and Law incumbency in the presidency - the PIS incumbent Duda cannot run for a third but the candidate from his own party is polling poorly.

Message to Trump et al - and the winners of the past year - you secured a mandate not necessarily for the policies you espoused in the campaign and are now trying to force thru, but as a protest vote against incumbency. In the US I think this is best reflected in the fact that Trump won close to four million less votes than Biden did back in 2020. The reality is that Trump does not have a huge popular mandate for radical reform, his win owed more to the fact that he was simply not Biden (or Harris who suffered the same tarnish from incumbency). Not that Trump cares. But let’s see if the electorate warms to Trump’s radical “throwing all the cards on the floor” approach to policy, or by the time of the mid terms voters conclude that actually it was more a case of Trump “throwing the baby out with the bath water”.