Israel has escalation dominance

Why would it not exploit that to the full?

One irony is that in the months leading up to Oct 7, Israel watchers’ focus had been primarily on institutional failings in Israel itself. Indeed, legal and political challenges to the Netanyahu administration and mass demonstrations focused on concerns over the erosion of the rule of law from legal amendments made by the Netanyahu administration to head off jeopardy from the courts. Discussion (perhaps remarkably) in markets was about state failure in itself, and polarisation in society and impacts on the performance of the Israeli economy. Little did we realise then that the biggest impact of these same failings would be on regional security and geopolitics as it seems likely that these same institutional failings and polarisation played no small part in events on October 7, with security and defence failings resulting. Events on October 7, and since with the war in Gaza, now Lebanon and escalation with Iran and its proxies elsewhere, have perhaps moved the narrative in Israel itself - providing a lifeline for Netanyahu who has put off a legal and political reckoning. Instead the focus is now on risks of escalation of the war in Gaza and now Lebanon into a broader regional war, perhaps even going global and bringing the US into direct conflict with Iran.

There is much still to suggest that escalation to a wider war can be avoided given such a war is not in the interests of most of the key regional and global players.

The Biden/Harris administration certainly do not want a wider war which would risk upward pressure on crude oil prices and gas prices at the pump just ahead of a knife edge U.S. election.

Iran itself has recently focused on trying to turnaround its economy, as a foil to domestic political unrest seen in recent years - and an all out war with Israel and the U.S. would surely put to bed any such hopes of an economic revival, and then political salvation.

Similarly Gulf states have focused in economic development in recent years - Visions 2030 et al - which are significantly  focused on diversification away from oil and to sectors such as tourism and logistics. The latter would be dealt a death knell from a wider regional conflict.

The desire to keep economic development in play underpinned efforts by the Gulf states and Iran to work to improve relations in recent years - and indeed, relations were, up unto October 7, the best they have been for many years.

Other regional states, such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon also clearly have no desire to see a wider regional war which would present huge challenges from higher oil prices, the likely further dislocation of populations and risks of domestic social unrest.

Even China has no interest to see oil and commodity prices soar, destabilising global markets and with it likely adding yet more grist to the mill of China’s own domestic economic problems - notable that China has expended some political capital to try to improve relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

However, the one regional player for which escalation likely suits is Israel.

For Netanyahu, personally, a never ending war puts off political and legal reckoning for issues prior and then related to October 7. Already a year of war has seen support for Netanyahu and his Likud party turn, as the nation rallies to the cause of confronting and defeating its enemies.

The war in Lebanon, in particular, I think has underlined Israel’s military and technological superiority over Hezbollah, Iran and its other proxies. The US/Western backstop, from munitions supplies, and air defence cover, almost presents Israel with a free hit against its foes. Israel has found itself in a unique position of having an overwhelming military and technological advantage - at least until its latest ground invasion of Lebanon. The longer the current conflict goes on the longer Israel has time to degrade the military capability of Iran, Hezbollah et al, under the cover of US support.

Why would it stop?

Interestingly here Israel sees weakness in Tehran and Washington, as neither wants a wider war, but Iran in particular is finding it difficult to maintain a conventional deterrent against Israeli strikes for fear of going thru the escalation gears to end up in an all out war with the US, which it absolutely does not want.

Weakness in Tehan, but also Washington - with US elections constraining Biden’s willingness to hold Israel to account for escalation - gives Israel in effect a free hit in this conflict. Why would it not continue to escalate until either the US decides to call time - unlikely before US elections - or Iran finds some deterrent.

And arguably the longer the current conflict has gone on, the more confident Israel has become that actually its military/technological advantage over Iran, and Iran’s inability to present any conventional deterrent, has presented a route to a final victory against Iran - a scenario of regime change in

Iran, or perhaps a scenario of eventual US involvement to bring the same effect.

For Israel escalation currently seems to bring no downside, as Iran is being forced to pull punches to avoid an all out war with the US, and when it has been forced to strike Israel with missiles and drone salvoes, the U.S. and West have provided a shield via additional missile defence.

Escalation for Israel brings further erosion of the threat from Iran and its proxies, and might ultimately present an opportunity for regime change in Iran or US intervention to rein in Iran’s nuclear capability. Israel is not afraid herein of a wider war, but perhaps sees that as the solution to its own longer term security woes.

And arguably escalation herein to include attacks now on Iranian oil infrastructure might also present the upside to Netanyahu of gifting victory in the U.S. elections to a Trump administration, where at least the GOP establishment is far more hawkish on Iran than the Biden/Harris team. Such attacks might not win Israel plaudits in the wider geopolitical space - not with the Global South or China - but why would it care when its decision point centres on what it sees as the longer term existential threat from Iran.

Does Iran have any credible defence?

Conventionally perhaps not, but surely events over recent weeks would now encourage Iran to fast track its nuclear programme - accelerating enrichment of weapons grade uranium. But in so doing they might just risk the same wider war with the US that they seemingly are so eager to avoid? Indeed, should the US receive intelligence that Iran was moving to secure sufficient weapons grade uranium to build a nuclear bomb would any U.S. administration see that as a red line that would have to precipitate a US, or perhaps joint US - Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. All that could then precipitate events to a wider war with much more serious regional and global implications.

And one obvious take out from the above is that in not providing any constraint on Israel, the Biden administration is actually fuelling escalation and indeed forcing Iran to resort to enriching more weapons grade uranium. It make a bigger war that much more likely.