Putin the failure

Four years to the day from the start of Putin’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, and close to 12 years since the annexation of Crimea, and it’s worthwhile looking back at how far from a win this is all for Putin.

First, the humiliation, that Russia, a supposed superpower, that had overwhelming (or so we all thought) military superiority over Ukraine, and which was supposed to have won a complete victory over Ukraine in a matter of days is still entrenched in a war it seemingly cannot win.

Imagine, Ukraine, a country with no NATO, has defeated the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it now to cower in ports on the East of the Sea, and away from its supposed home in Sebastopol. And Sebastopol itself has come under Ukrainian attack and is no longer safe for Russians - and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was supposed to secure the peninsula against NATO encroachment. Russia does not have NATO encroaching on Crimea, but Ukraine attacking it to the point that it is no longer safe.

And the war was supposed to protect the homeland but the Ukrainians have managed to take the war to Russia, invading Belgorod, and launching countless missiles deep into Russia, and putting a large weight of Russia’s oil refineries out of business.

Second, and Russia’s failure to win a decisive and speedy victory against Ukraine has diminished its global status - making it now the clear junior partner to China, and having to beg for weapons and troops from Iran and North Korea to even defend the Motherland.

Third, the supposed might of Russian military power has been seen thru. That Ukraine, often using second or third generation NATO kit, has been able to hold back Russia, using fourth or even fifth generation military kit says it all. Russian military technology has been exposed as second rate, and Russian defence sales overseas have collapsed from tens of billions per year to a few billions. Countries are now queuing up to buy US Patriot missile systems, not Russian S400s. Türkiye is even now trying to figure out how to get rid of the S400 system it has as it wants to get back into the US F35 supply chain. India is now buying French fast yet, not the Russian equivalents it has relied on for decades.

Fourth, stuck in a war it cannot win in Ukraine, Russia has been unable to send military support to its former allies under attack - including Assad in Syria, Iran and Maduro in Venezuela. Russia has lost its proxies one by one as it cannot spare the military resources to help them out in their hour of need. We also saw this in the recent final decisive war in Nagorny Karabakh where Russia was unable to spare military resources to honour security agreements with Armenia. Russian military kit’s vulnerabilities was again exposed by Turkish and Israeli military technology.

Fifth, the human costs of the war to Russia have been immense. Western estimates suggest over a million casualties, including hundreds of thousands dead. While Putin does not care about the human costs, and the losses are being disproportionately born by poor regions, particularly in the Muslim south of Russia, eventually the trauma suffered by such a large section of the population will come home (literally) to haunt Putin. Millions of veterans will demand large pensions, and social care and provision if not to cause huge social problems and even political challenges to Putin. Perhaps Putin is now stuck in a war he cannot end, as ending the war will leave him subject to being held to account - why did Russia suffer such staggering losses, and what for?

Sixth, the economic costs to Russia have been huge, well in excess of $1 trillion, perhaps even multiples of this now. Consider herein the loss of $330 billion in CBR assets, capital flight of several hundreds of billions since the full scale invasion and imposition of sanctions. Add in market to market losses on Russian debt and equity markets. There is then the negative growth impacts of sanctions, likely to have been at least 1% year, since 2021, and perhaps longer since the first imposition of sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. On a $2.5 trillion economy, the cumulative loss there could be several hundreds of billions of dollars. And then the actual cost of the war, with defence spending likely increased from $50-60 billion a year to closer to $250 billion annual or more. For a relatively small, and economy now restricted by sanctions, this is causing difficult trade offs, guns versus butter. Cuts and stagnation in large swathes of the economy, bad debts, and recession while other military related sections of the economy boom. And then the social costs of paying $30-50,000 a head to recruit troops, and their support, if they get any, upon injury and demobilisation. And for the economy in general growth is lower, inflation is higher, the budget deficit and borrowing higher, interest rates higher, and people generally poorer. Less consumption and more spending on sectors of the economy - the military - which adds little to the real wellbeing of the population.

Putin is making Russians poorer, a lot poorer, and the longer the war goes on the worse it will get.

Seventh, and related, Russia has got itself into an arms race with the West that it simply cannot win. Russia might be spending $250 billion a year on defence, versus perhaps $100 billion by Ukraine, but Europe is now stepping up defence spending to 2% of GDP, then 3.5% of GDP, and 5% all in. On a $25 trillion European economy, that will be approaching $1 trillion, or 40% of the size of the Russian economy. Shades here of the late USSR, and it’s eventual collapse after its failed military intervention in Afghanistan and then losing the arms race with NATO.

Eigth, and NATO related, Putin claims he invaded Ukraine to stop NATO enlargement, but because of that invasion he now has more, not less NATO on his border, with the accession of Sweden and Finland, and as above, a NATO in Europe at least which is now rearming to counter the Russian threat at pace. And remember here that both Sweden and Finland had strong non aligned/neutral status prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But they now see the main threat to their security as coming from Russia.

Similarly, the change in risk perceptions in mainland Europe is stark. Five years back, I think the German or Scandinavian establishment, or popular sense even, was not that Russia was the prime and existential threat to Europe. But now in Germany, or Denmark, France or Sweden, it is absolutely clear through increased focus on defence spending or support to Ukraine that they view Russia as their biggest and existential threat. Putin has rallied Europe against him, and unified European opinion to support Ukraine and the broader defence of Europe.

Ninth, weirdly, Russia attacked because it was concerned about Ukraine’s military threat - even though Ukraine had only several hundreds troops back in 2014, and they were poorly armed. But because of the invasion Ukraine has rearmed to present now an 800,000 fighting force, and to become one of the most potent military forces in Europe, and able not only defend itself over fourh long years of attack but to take the war to Russia.

And Putin has shaped the debate about the war into a push against NATO enlargement to Europe, but in a way Ukrainian membership of NATO is less the story, than how Ukraine has now become the mainstay for European defence. It is not a case of European NATO coming to Ukraine’s defence against Russia, but Europe’s realisation that their best defence against Russia is Ukraine, and ensuring that it does not lose this war. Hence therein the huge financial commitments now from Europe to Ukriane, covering the full $100 billion a year cost of keeping Ukraine funded in this war.

Tenth, well if the war was to bring Ukraine back under the Russian orbit, we are I think further from that than ever. Whereas in 2013 opinion polls in Ukraine still showed little strong anti Russian feeling, after a decade or more of brutal attack the Ukrainian population are clear in their orientation. Large majorities want deeper integration with the West, and single digits still look towards Russia. And whereas in 2014 there was little strong sense of national identity in Ukraine, Russia’s actions have created that. They have helped forge a sense of Ukrainian identify and clear desire to have a separate course from Russia. That was less than clear back in 2014. Putin’s action have forged a nation in Ukraine which can still defeat Putin and Russia. It is still possible that the war into Ukraine could see the ousting of Putin, and because of all the failures identified above. I am not sure that is still the base case, but it is not an impossibility and likely would be the quickest route to ending this war.

Slava Ukraini and fuck Putin