Reflections on developments in the Middle East

Some of you have asked for my views on on-going developments in the Middle East and how I see the broader global geopolitical implications.

Hitherto I have held back from commenting preferring to leave it to much better qualified regional commentators to show their expertise. But as the Hamas - Israel war unfolds and as more innocent civilians (now mostly Palestinians) are killed, injured and displaced the risks of a wider global crisis seems to be rising. And it is hard not to speak out now, especially for the many civilians who don’t have a voice, or indeed seemingly any good survival options.

First things first, Hamas’ attack on innocent civilians in Israel last weekend was abhorrent, and in no way shape or form was it justified. And Israel absolutely has a right to defend itself and to launch military action against Hamas. But in conducting military operations against Hamas Israel has a duty to pay due care and attention for the lives of innocent Palestinians - and I would argue that the bulk of Palestinians living in Gaza are not responsible for the actions of Hamas which are largely beyond their control. Half of the population seem to be kids - how are they responsible?

Palestinians also have a right to live in Gaza and the West Bank. They have a common heritage in Palestine to Israelis. They live though in occupied lands and don’t have the same basic rights - some have even drawn comparison with apartheid in South Africa (President Cyril Ramaphoza himself today made exactly this point albeit his views might have had more resonance if he had expressed similar cares for Ukrainians dying at the hands of Russian aggression in Ukraine - many in the Global South appear to operate with the same double standards as the West). And I would argue that unless these core inequities are addressed this conflict will go on and on and the ongoing Israeli military action will solve nothing - only accentuate the hate and cycle of vengeance attacks we continue to see.

The Israeli demand for Palestinians in north Gaza to move south in 24H surely is inhumane, infeasible and worrying when combined with suggestions from some in Israel that Palestinians from Gaza should be relocated to Sinai in Egypt. This smacks of ethnic cleansing which I would have thought the West understood from its experience from the wars for Yugoslav succession. Our governments seem to learn nothing from history.

Surely no civilised country can punish a whole nation for the actions of a minority. The language being used by many and, indeed actions on the battlefield would suggest otherwise now.

It is sad to see the lack of humanity from the extremes on both sides.

An Israeli life should have exactly the same value as that of a Muslim, Christian or whoever. But the West’s hitherto very one sided response risks signalling otherwise and builds on twenty years (if not much longer) of failed Western policy towards the Middle East and shown with the disastrous US/U.K. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Unfortunately we are also seeing that with the Western response to the migrant crisis in Europe - with very different receptions for Ukrainians as opposed to those of a different colour or religion. There had been much to suggest that risks from extremist Islamist terror movements, like ISIS, had been reduced in recent years, as the number of global terror attacks instigated by such groups has reduced. But events in Gaza, and the one-sided response of the West seen in recent days, risks fuelling support again for such groups.

In terms of global implications?

My initial take was that the risks of a wider conflict involving Iran, and bringing in the US were limited. I think neither Iran nor the US want to be dragged into a war with each other at this stage.

The US is struggling to maintain support for Ukraine both financially and militarily with particular concern there about stocks of munitions. Even a limited Israeli operation in Gaza could well deplete Western munition stocks to critical levels, potentially than starving Ukraine of the supplies it needs both to sustain its ongoing counteroffensive but perhaps even maintain a defensive stance against Russia. Munitions would be even further depleted if the US is then dragged into a direct conflict with Iran. And then there is the question for the US as to whether China might see the US with its hands full supporting Ukraine, Israel and then at war with Iran as an opportunity to launch military action to take Taiwan. The US might be able to sustain support for allies in two of these conflicts, but surely not four.

Economically Iran would appear to be in no position to engage Israel and the US in a war. The regime has just negotiated through a period of domestic political unrest and seems intent on trying to boost its economy to buy off political unrest. Recent talks to reduce tensions with the U.S. saw agreement on the release of $6bn in frozen assets and Chinese brokered talks have eased tensions with Saudi Arabia. This has opened the way for an easing of the economic logjam around Iran. This positive economic progress would surely sharply reverse if war drums with Israel and the US beat louder.

Iran surely sees political advantage in Hamas’ attack on Israel - even its defeat might play into its hands as leaving it, and its proxies like Hezbollah, left as the sole voice of much of the Islamic world in standing up to what many Muslims would see as Israeli aggression and Western double standards in the region and sunni Gulf states’, perhaps along with Egypt’s, weakness in the region and inability to act to counter Israeli action in Gaza.

Iran’s advantage surely is staying on the sidelines of the conflict, avoiding direct conflict (not even thru it’s Shia proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon) with the US or Israel, but egging Hamas on from afar.

It is notable here that both the US and Iran have been playing down talk of Iranian direct involvement in last weekend’s Hamas attack on Israel. And the US has been seeking to play down risks of a wider regional conflict (read with Iran) and calling for its friends in the region - Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf and even China to act to ease broader regional tensions.

If, as some argue, Iran helped plan Hamas’ attacks then one might have expected a coordinated attack on Israel by Hezbollah from the north. This has not happened albeit the two sides have partaken in relatively low level artillery exchanges. The latter is though not that out of the ordinary. Rather Hezbollah and, by close association, Iran, seem to be carefully ensuring they stay on the sidelines.

I can though see why some in Israel would want to broaden the conflict to include the US and Iran. For PM Netanyahu implication (no evidence provided) of Iranian involvement in Hamas’ attack last weekend would help deflect blame for his own failings on the security front in the run up to last weekend’s attack (judicial reform was surely an unwanted distraction). It would further help unify the nation around his leadership - indeed it has already seen the formation of a unity government and set back the course of any potential legal peril against Netanyahu. And, importantly many in Israel have long wanted US military assistance to strike down Iran’s nuclear programme once and for all. Evidence (lacking at present)  linking Iran to the Hamas attack would then leave the US with fewer excuses then not to join Israel in striking back directly against Iran.

A direct US - Iran military confrontation is still not my base case although it’s possible that any U.S. action would be targeted against Iranian proxies like Hezbollah.

For the broader Middle East the challenge will be in managing/containing the wide popular revulsion from the Arab street over Israeli action in Gaza and perceived Western double standards. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have released statements calling for Israeli restraint in Gaza which will resonate with their populations. It is hard though not to see Saudi Arabia’s effort to normalise relations with Israel as one of the obvious casualties of events over the past week. Longer term though I think Gulf leaderships will still want to try and maintain the latter endeavour as part of their broader economic development “visions”. How long such efforts are delayed, and whether terminally, will depend how events now play out in Gaza.

Egypt and Jordan will now have important roles as peacemakers and havens for yet more refugees. It’s hard to see the Israeli suggestion for the population of Gaza to be relocated to Sinai and then rapid economic development there sponsored by huge Western and Gulf financial support flying. Egypt might though hope, in any event, to get stronger financial backing from the Gulf and the West both to assure its place as a regional peacemaker but also to ensure political stability in Egypt itself at such a critical juncture for security in the region. In recent months we have seen Gulf states play harder ball with Egypt over financial bailouts - which perhaps reflected a view that with direct talks with Israel over normalisation Egypt’s own critical security status in the region was denuded. This might now prove to be an erroneous assumption.

Our leaders fail to learn that much from history - sad, and worrying.