Russia - thoughts on the Macron visit
And that long table
Spot on from Kurt Volker…
First, Macron’s visit was more about his own re-election bid, rather than him being serious about thinking that he could bring a resolution of this issue. The attempt then to talk up the results of the trip, with little basis for this in reality, and then being slammed down by Pskov, with no offer of de-escalation.
Second, the messaging from Moscow, with the long table meant to show how far apart the two sides are. Russia was almost theatrical in terms of the staging here.
And in the end, Putin appearing angry, and not helping himself by putting Ukraine down by use of the lurid rhyme.
And I think the most salient point for me was when a reporter asked Putin direct as to whether he is going to invade Ukraine, and he failed to answer.
Lots of focus now on Normandy format talks this Thursday. But while both sides talk about the need to implement Minsk 2, the reality is that both sides have different perceptions of what Minsk 2 is, and zero appetite to implement it as per the desires of the opposing side. For Minsk 2 to work, someone has to concede ground to the other, and I just don’t see that, Moscow has been clear, that they expect the letter of the Minsk 2 agreement to be implemented, or the letters as the read them.
Strong sense from all this is that both sides are just playing an elaborate diplomatic dance, going through the motions, but not preparing to really deal.
The West and Ukraine are happy to stall, not give anything away, buy time, a) for Ukraine to better arm and defend itself, b) the West to get thru this winter and to give themselves an opportunity then to try and diversify and reduce dependency on Russian energy until Putin comes knocking on the door next time - and there is an understanding that there surely will be a next time as Putin is like a dog with a bone on this one. But there is a recognition that concessions to Putin at this time will weaken both the West and Ukraine. Putin only takes, never gives concessions, and if he succeeds this time in using force, or the threat of force, to secure concessions, he will be back again, using the same salami tactics to win more concessions.
The sense here with Putin is that the Russian side have never been that serious in negotiations. They set red lines for the West that they knew were never going to be agreed upon.
But the question is that while the West wants to buy time, is Putin willing to concede time? Is he bluffing, can he risk his bluff being called, or does he need to reveal his hand, or raise the stakes still further? Can he fold at this point in time and risk being dealt a weaker hand next time he wants to sit down at the table?
I go back to the idea as to what has Putin achieved thus far from all this? Have any of his red lines been agreed upon - no. And yet by using the threat of force, we are seeing the West unify in opposition to him by agreeing a firm sanctions response, and providing more assistance to Ukraine, and surely the biggest result from all this will be accelerated energy diversification away from Russian energy/commodities. He has shown he can mobilise thousands of troops at short notice, and use menace, but this is not dividing the West but unifying it if anything - look at those opinion polls released today showing greater public support in the West for supporting Ukraine. He has a large military force, but is he willing to use it, is the threat fo forces credible, and will the use of military force be effective if it is actually used?
We get back to the idea that the status quo, and playing for time, were not working for Putin, and he has tried to mix that up with the deployment of the military on Ukraine’s borders, but has that improved his hand, has it changed the status quo in his favour? I would argue it has not. So what does he do now, withdraw with a weakened hand/position, or double up?