Time for a mea culpa from Mearsheimer?

Obviously all the focus is on the on-going battle of Donbas which could still be a defining moment in Russia’s war on Ukraine.

It’s hard to provide much added value commentary therein as there are qualified military analysts providing their much more educated thoughts than I could ever do. That said it seems to be developing into a war of attrition with an artillery dual being waged with troops now largely being deployed in trenches. As Ukrainian officials are revealing their forces appear outgunned and are suffering heavy casualties - 100-200 KIA daily and many more likely injured. It seems as though the Ukrainian strategy is to try and delay the Russian advance in Donbas to allow Ukrainian forces to be re-supplied by the West to perhaps allow a counter offensive in the south - in Kherson and Zaporizhiya - to divert Russian forces then from Donbas. Ukraine still seems to have no shortage of manpower - unlike Russia - but training enough troops to be able to put them into combat, combat ready, is a challenge. Unlike Russia, Ukraine does not appear to view its troops as mere canon fodder.

It’s touch and go, but it seems as though the battle for Donbas will be decided over the next few weeks.

But even if Russia succeeds in pushing Ukrainian forces back out of Donbas it seems unlikely that they can use this to generate further momentum to launch another thrust further into Ukraine and perhaps against Kyiv again. The longer Ukrainian troops hold out in Donbas the more they erode Russia’s ability to sustain an offensive deeper into Ukraine but also give Ukraine more chance to build further defensive lines to counter such a risk.

There are still many moving parts in this conflict including Putin’s game plan, Ukraine’s continued ability to resist and the West’s staying power and willingness to continue to fund and arm Ukraine.

A few weeks back it appeared as though Russia had been pushed back onto the back foot after it’s defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, with troop withdrawals north and East around Sumy and Kharkhiv. Messaging from some parts of the Russian media seemed to suggest Moscow might be planning exit strategies - perhaps surprised by Ukraine’s willingness to fight and Western unity in support of Ukraine. One senses now though a new found determination by Moscow to slug it out still further in Donbas. Perhaps this reflects some success with the new Russian military strategy in Donbas - the concentration of forces and resort to playing to its strengths in longer range artillery exchanges. I also think that Moscow has been encouraged by evidence of divisions in the West - interventions by Macron and Kissinger suggesting deal making with Moscow, Hungary blocking aspects of the latest EU sanctions package, indecision in Berlin and Turkey looking to delay and exploit Finland and Sweden’s NATO entry bid for its own advantage. 

I sense here that Putin feels that if Russia sustains the conflict a while longer he can force the Ukrainians to accept a peace on his terms. I think also he is betting on France, Germany and even Turkey bullying Ukraine into accepting his deal. 

Putin’s public comments this week which, in effect, signalled that the war in Ukraine is not about NATO enlargement but Russian expansion - seeming to brush Ukraine off as a mere colony - were actually extraordinary but I sense also an attempt to lay the ground in Russia for what Putin could see as a potential peace, for a period at least. 

The comments were extraordinary as they debunk the myth previously pushed by the Kremlin that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a defensive action by Russia in response to over enlargement of NATO. I wonder if now those like Mearsheimer will offer a mea culpa for pushing the prior Russian narrative that the war was really NATO’s fault. Putin essentially revealed that his problem is with Ukraine, it’s sovereignty and Ukrainians’ identity separate from Russians’. 

I think though by pushing the message that Russia is just retaking lands which it views as its own, and it’s own historical legacy or heritage, restoring to Russia what is its own, Putin can now declare the “special military operation” as a victory. We could now see Russia announce its formal annexation of most of Donbas and the land corridor to Crimea - much of Kherson and Zaporizhiya. He can tell Russians “look this was all about taking back Russian territory, and I have given you back Donbas, Crimea, much of Kherson and Zaporizhiya, look we won”. Perhaps that could be enough of a victory for him for the time being. This might stack up better than a much longer war with a huge loss of blood and treasure.

If this was instead about stopping NATO enlargement well it’s then a bit difficult selling this as a win as now, and because of the invasion, Finland and Sweden have declared their decision to join NATO and NATO is deploying more assets towards Russian borders. He has succeeded in getting more, not less NATO, which will also now massively increase defence spending to counter the now obvious threat from Russia. You could also argue that Ukraine is more determined than ever to join NATO and will be much better armed to NATO standard and much more closely allied with NATO against Russia than before the invasion. This is actually a huge defeat for Russia if pushing NATO back was all part of Putin’s plan and the primary objective of the invasion. It is now surely clear that it was not which explains Putin changing the narrative to war and being instead territorial gain.

I assume though that in weeks to come Putin will attempt to declare a great victory to the Russian people. This will present the leadership in Ukraine with a dilemma. Past experience suggests that the likes of France, Germany, Italy and Turkey will likely push hard for Ukraine to accept any deal presented by Putin. But in agreeing to a ceasefire and/or peace deal Putin will demand that Ukraine accepts the loss of Donbas and large swathes of Kherson and Zaporizhiya. The political mood in Kyiv still seems set against any such compromise with polls suggesting that over 90% of the population still expect a Ukrainian victory. Will accelerating losses in Donbas change this? And will the threat of key European allies threatening to reduce military and financial support force Ukraine to accept the peace deal likely on offer from Putin.

The problem herein for the Ukrainian side is that they know that once any such ceasefire deal is agreed, that they will likely be signing away the loss of 20% of their territory. They will likely have to give up on hopes of a future counter offensives to retake territory for fear then of being accused of being the aggressor and risking losing Western backing. They also know that likely Putin will not stop at the 20% of Ukrainian territory that Russia now occupies and Putin will just be biding his time for the next attack - regrouping and rebuilding the Russian military. As that surely is the experience from the annexation of Crimea and the Minsk 1&2 peace deals. They were all just stages in Putin’s greater plan to take the whole of Ukraine.

Fortunately it seems to me that enough Western nations - the US, U.K., Scandies, Balts, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic et al now understand Putin and will allow the Ukrainians to make their own decisions. They will continue to arm and finance Ukraine as long as it wants to resist Russia. And at this stage it appears that Ukraine is willing to hold out as long as it takes - as when the realisation dawns that Putin actually wants the destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainians, they have no other choice. It’s Ukraine’s “State of Israel” moment.

So that puts the ball back in Putin’s court - he can push for peace on his terms but it will be rejected and unless he is willing to go back to February 23 settings he will be in for a very long and very costly war that will grind Russia down.

We have though learned from the period before February 24 that appeasement of Putin does not work. And experience after February 24 suggests that the only thing Putin actually respects is hard power. In the conduct of this war Ukraine and it’s allies have continuously crossed Putin’s red lines - in the supply of armaments, SWIFT sanctions, CBR asset freezes, NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden, use of WMD - and Putin has always blinked. He has proven to be a poor poker player and even worse tactician/strategist. He now has a losing hand and let’s just hope he realises sooner rather than later and folds.