As many others have now concluded, a pretty remarkable MSC. Indeed, this year’s MSC was perhaps as defining an event as was Putin’s last appearance back in 2007 which I think marked a shift in Russian policy towards the West in a malign direction. The result of that was the subsequent invasion of Georgia in 2008 followed then by his first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and then the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Seen link herein to full script,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034
Hegseth, Vance et al sent a clear message to Europe that it can no longer rely on the US security backstop. That penny, or dollar cent, dropped but also with Vance’s speech I think the euro cent also finally dropped that Europe does not share the same values nor interests as Trump’s USA. On the values front, Europe values much more the rule of law, the fight against corruption and kleptocracy, and we can debate free speech herein (Europe has limitations on race hate speech, perhaps a reflection of its own history with regards to the Holocaust , while in the US free speech also has limits when its comes to criticism over Gaza policy). See my earlier post herein about the different national security interests of the UK (and mostly also Europe) and the US under Trump administration.
https://timothyash.substack.com/p/the-trump-peace-plan?r=ynli4
The longer term conclusions for Europe have surely to be:
a) Europe has to plan to be responsible for its own defence, ex the USA, so NATO is dead, and hence European countries will have to massively increase defence spending, from 2% of GDP, to 3% and perhaps on to 5%.
b) Europe might need to look for alternative alliances and security arrangements, defence cooperation, including perhaps with Turkey, the Gulf states, and even China - note given that the Trump - Putin bromance might be part of a “Reverse Nixonian”, i.e, a new U.S. - Russia alliance against China, pushed I think by likes of Dugin, Carlson, et al.
But building an alternative security/defence arrangement to save Europe will take time, and what to do with the near and present danger from Russia?
The assumption from Europe there has to be that Putin will not stop in Ukraine - surely prudence suggests Europe has to plan for the worst, so future Russian encroachments beyond Ukraine, into Molodova, the Baltics states, et al.
The best line of defence has to be to ensure Ukraine does not lose, or still survives as a buffer for Europe to give it time to shore up its own defences.
The challenge herein is Trump’s current peace overtures to Putin, and the looming Putin-Trump summit in Saudi Arabia. Having given away much of the leverage the West had over Putin (NATO membership, territorial concessions, and US security guarantees for Ukraine or for a Western peacekeeping force for Ukraine), it is hard to see what Trump can deliver which will now ensure Ukraine’s security. What is Putin going to give as a concession? So far from the Trump administration it is a one way stream of concessions to Russia. Putin will surely see Trump as a soft touch, a weak, incompetent negotiator, and will push for maximum concessions from Ukraine, including limitations on its future military capability, regime change in Kyiv, or even constitutional changes in Ukraine to essentially ensure Russia’s veto on its future orientation. That is a recipe for state failure in Ukraine. Herein either Russia will exploit the limitations on Ukraine’s future military capability to invade again, or the lack of security in Ukraine will ensure its failed future economic development, which will mean future economic, social and political weakness, again to be exploited by Putin.
The nightmare now for Europe is Ukraine’s state failure, which would mean tens of millions of Ukrainians refugees moving West (straining the political, social and economic fabric of Europe, further fuelling the far right), and Russia subsuming Ukraine’s now enormous and effective military industrial complex. The combination of Russia and Ukraine’s military industrial complexes - first and second now in Europe - would be an absolutely existential threat to Europe.
No doubt European politicians have argued the above to Trump until they are blue in the face, but clearly, Trump has few cares.
He clearly just sees Ukraine, like Gaza, as a real estate asset, an asset to be leveraged, which was I think seen by the quite remarkable trip last week of Scott Bessant, US Treasury Secretary to Kyiv, armed with an agreement that Ukraine had to sign away half its natural resource wealth for a very vague future commitment of US support. Actually as far as Trump is concerned this is all just pay back for the hundreds of billions of dollars of US support already given to Ukraine following the full scale invasion. Let Trump not let actual facts get in the way of his argument - given well established data suggests that US support has, as yet, been less than $100 billion. Pretty obscene that a country that has lost hundreds of thousands of people dead and injured in the defence of Western liberal market democracy is now being sent an invoice for the pleasure.
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/
When faced with the likely Trump - Putin peace plan, which will likely involve no concessions to Ukraine, and particularly not on the most important point for Ukraine, its future security, I think Ukraine will be minded to walk away from any deal. Why would Ukraine accept any ceasefire that fails to provide any assurance as to its future security? Trump clearly wants a speedy deal - to secure his Nobel prize - then Ukriane likely will use its leverage while it has it, and will play hard to get. It still has close 1 million troops on the battlefield, an ability to produce 40% of its own munitions, considerable munitions and financing (over $140 billion available to it) in reserves, and the prospect that Europe still has an incentive in ensuring it does not lose - as Europe knows it will be the next to feel the sharp end of a Russian bayonet. Europe will continue to fund Ukraine’s defence and hope to secure munitions to assist therein from wherever globally.
For Russia, the above means an extended war, little sanctions relief from Europe, at least, and the reality that while Trump is likely to step aside from supporting Ukraine, Russia still has to take the victory, on the battlefield. This still suggests years of war and sacrifice for Russia, and Russians. And the longer the war goes on, the weaker still Putin will look.
And the leverage Ukraine has will be in embarrassing the US, and Trump, as being wimps in the face of an aggressor, and of damaging US alliances, and trust in the US as a partner, for the bigger US battle for hegemony with China.
As is, Ukraine has little incentive to play ball with Trump’s sell out (down the river) peace plan.
I understand that Trump gets a high from summitry, that he sees it as a return to the Reagan years, that he sees it as his best chance for the Nobel Peace Prize, but giving away all your cards before Putin will even agree to start talks is just folly.
I can't help going all the way back to the Helsinki meeting during Trump's first term as president. What hold has Putin over Trump that every time they have a private meeting (or this time a phone call), that the result is always so positive to Putin?
What happened when Trump, as a businessman way back when, visited Moscow for the Miss Universe pageant?