Turkish perspectives on the crisis in the Middle East

Interesting to hear Jeff Flake suggest his Turkish contacts are downplaying Middle East escalation risks.

https://www.ft.com/content/404a3537-ef90-49e7-9fce-2fc621980107

That’s not my impression.

Indeed, I spent the last few days in Turkey, meeting with the wealth of Turkish expertise covering the Middle East. The aim was to get out of the Western box and hear an alternative view of the conflict in Gaza and the risks of a wider regional conflict.

I had sessions with various foreign policy types, ex diplomats, analysts and journalists - and these spanned the political spectrum from AKP supporting types to more secular and opposition types.

Understandably, I guess, given Turkey’s location, and Turkey’s own history of intervention in the region (Syria, Iraq, North Africa, et al) , Turkey takes the Middle East seriously, and has considerable intellectual capacity thinking thru the challenges for the region.

I present here a few take-outs.

First, there was universal perplexion, even anger from some, at the brain dead Western state level approach to the crisis in Gaza - hard not to share that. Notable that there was also near universal criticism of Hamas for the attacks on October 7, and a willingness from many in Turkey to call them out as an atrocity. But then the universal view was that Israel, while having a right to defend itself, has crossed all lines of basic decency, and laws of war in its subsequent assault on Gaza.  Many argued in support of the view that Israel is actually now conducting genocide against Palestinians - and this view is obviously supported by many in the global south, and indeed in much grass roots opinion in Europe, and even in the left in the US. But Western governments appear paralysed in their ability to hold Israel back, or hold it to account, or even to criticise Israel. The memory there of the holocaust seems to constrain and cower Western governments in their criticism of Israel.

All Turkish commentators argued that the West talks about its values but is selective. Democracy, human rights and conducting war by international humanitarian standards is held on a pinnacle in Ukraine, against Russia, but not when is comes to Palestinians in Gaza. They seem not to have the same rights as Ukrainians. Does it reflect fundamental racism in the West - Ukrainians are white, and Palestinians are brown?

But what message does that send the world about the actual values of the West - two faced, and institutionally racist?

So the West’s approach to the war in Gaza is actually damaging its own case in trying to encourage wider support for Ukraine.

Ukrainians have a right to their own sovereign territory, but in supporting an Israeli administration that opposes a two state solution, and is now actively taking land from Palestinians in the West Bank, it is showing that that same right to their own land and territory is not an option for Palestinians. One right for Ukrainians, not for Palestinians.

Second, and specifically with respect to escalation risks, the view was that Israel has been captured by Netanyahu and the far right and that prior assumptions as to the motivation of Israel, to cap regional escalation may no longer hold. Again the line was that the West is unwilling to call Israel to account for ethnic cleansing in Gaza, and even the West Bank. And the weakness here of the Biden administration and the West in general is making escalation into a wider war more likely. It is also playing into the hand of extremist organisations like ISIS, and actually making the West less safe.

A brown Muslim life, a Palestinian life, seems to count much less than a white Israeli life, which is now reflected in the lack of Western response to the totally disproportionate casualty count from Israelis killed on October 7, to Palestinians in the run up and past that date - multiples by tens.

Obviously there is the fear of an escalation of war from Gaza, to Lebanon and then a direct Israel - US - Iran war. There is recognition that many players in the region do not want escalation to a wider war, including the Biden administration, the Gulf states, Turkey, China, Europe and even Iran.

Looking at the motivations of the various powers here:

The Biden administration has zero appetite for being dragged into another Middle East war, one which would have an uncertain outcome, but would further elevate gas prices at the pump for Biden, now Harris, heading to a closely fought US election.

The Gulf states, for their part, are all focused on their new economic development models, their “Visions” - some Gulf states thought, before October 7, that the Abraham Accords were the route to a solution to tensions in the Middle East and that the Palestinian issue would be resolved as a by-product. The reality is that sweeping the Palestinian issue under the carpet just provided an incendiary for events on October 7. A wider regional war though would set back the Gulf states hopes of being hubs for tourism and logistics and economic development - which had already seen some reach out to Iran in recent years. They are hence still active in peace making.

I questioned why the Gulf states were unwilling to take a more active role in peace - using their huge leverage now in energy markets, defence orders and actually their financial muscle thru their sovereign wealth funds (with assets of close to $10 trillion) to push a more balanced approach from the West. The Turkish view there was that on the sovereign asset front these states are worried at having their own assets sanctioned. Generally also leaderships in these states have no love lost for Hamas, and political Islam, but are minded that the Palestinian cause is popular at the grassroots level roots levels in their countries. They are hence carefully managing thru a difficult political route.

Iran - it’s overall strategy is about regime survival which would be at risk from a wider war with Israel and the US. Could the regime survive such an event? Unsure, albeit the Turks I met suggested that there is much durability in the regime. It’s whole strategic approach over decades has been to build a network of proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias and now to some extent Hamas, to give it escalation options which fall short of an all out war. As we saw in April, Iran will feel the need to respond to the humiliation of the attack in

Iran to kill Haniyeh, but will want to try and manage the retaliation to limit the chances of a wider war. Any retaliation is likely to be managed and even choreographed with the US/West -  note the delay in responding, almost to allow the US to get additional naval and air defence assets into the region. Iran is trying to play ball as much as possible as it can with the West to limit escalation risk.

Just a note here that the Islamic Republic is also focused on economic improvement mirroring the visions in the Gulf - we have seen reach out to Gulf states, and China, to assist herein. It views economic development as a means to offset political pressures seen in recent years. Obviously a war with Israel - the US - would put paid to hopes of improving economic conditions in Iran, and will just accentuate political problems at home for the regime.

Israel - the question raised by many of my interloculators in Turkey is does Israel still fear a wider war, or with the use of the far right, and Netanyahus own political and legal problems, do they view this now as part of the solution? Yes, a wider war would risk significant damage to Israel - as Iran and its proxies now have significant new missile capability, but does time now just work in Iran’s favour until it inevitably secure nuclear capability? Do the powers that be in Israel just see the opportunity as now to finally address the long term threat from Iran?

Views were mixed here, as they do seem to be in Israel, with elements in the Israel security services and the IDF more fearful than perhaps Netanyahu and the Israeli far right of a wider war.

For Netanyahu, though what is the downside from escalation from here? A continuation of the war in Gaza, it’s extension to Southern Lebanon and perhaps even Iran, ensures his continuous stay in office, buoys his support in opinion polls, and puts off his political and legal reckoning. In many respects he has a free hit against Iran, as Israel at this stage has escalation domination - Netanyahu knows perhaps that Iran fears a broader regional war, involving the US, much more than Israel. Israel can hit Iran and can expect a much lower level of retaliation.

I think here we saw that with the recent assasination of Hamas chief negotiator in Gaza peace talks, Ismail Haniyeh, in Iran. How better to send a message that you have no interest in ceasefire talks than by killing your counterpart in talks, and one seen as on the more moderate end of the militant spectrum within Hamas - and to be replaced by now by a more radical leader in Yahya Sinwar?

Netanyahu perhaps sees this as an opportunity to cleanse Israel’s opponents in Iran and its proxies, while it has an asymmetrical retaliation advantage. And the worst case for Israel is escalation drags the US into war with Iran to finally solve Israel’s Iran problem. The additional benefit for Netanyahu is escalation in the short term undermines the Biden administration, and Harris by association, increasing the chances of a victory by a much more pro Israel GOP in November. This message already seemed to be a theme of Netanyahu’s visit to D.C. last month, and then the briefing against Harris subsequently.

So in terms of the outlook for Gaza the Turkish view was pretty grim. Meanwhile, the perception was that risks are rising around a regional war. But a big take out was frustration with the double standards of the West - the morale bankruptcy. “Don’t come here lecturing us about democracy and human rights after what we have seen in Gaza”. That’s the lasting message I took away from the trip.