Ukraine creates multiple risk points now for Putin

And that’s precisely the point

There appears to be a different mood around Ukraine at the present, a sense of confidence that the momentum in the war with Russia is moving in its favour, and against Russia.

Drones, technology and financing - assured now by Europe - seem to have put Ukraine in the driving seat. Ukraine has the innovation advantage and European money - the €90 billion EU loan agreed in December and another €100 billion in EU preaccession funds slated for after 2027 - has enabled Ukraine to take its innovation edge and at last get to scale in drone production.

Ukraine appears to have held the line on the front line in Donbas, and elsewhere, turning the battlefield into a war of attrition and a drone killing field. But Ukraine’s long range drone capability, augmented by the move to scale noted above, is now taking the war to Russia. We have seen that over the past few weeks with high profile attacks on St Petersburg and Moscow, both appearing as huge embarrassments to President Putin.

What seems to be the case is that Ukraine is trying to use its advantage to escalate to impose even higher military, economic and political costs on Russia. The ultimate aim I think here is to force Russia to negotiate on a more realistic agenda from the maximalist demands presented at the Anchorage summit between President Trump and Putin.

A number of key offensive actions by Ukraine should be noted/underlined:

First, Ukraine’s continued deep strike drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, with strikes across Russia on oil refineries and energy related infrastructure, plus the military industrial complex. The aim is to wear down Russia’s war machine just as it appears to be facing capacity constraints - labour shortages. Attacks on refineries are aimed at creating shortages and bringing the war home to the Russian population plus limiting fuel supplies to the front lines.

In terms of attacks on the Russian energy infrastructure, Ukraine had held back previously in respect to the demands of Western allies, nervous over their likely impact on global energy prices and the global economy. Ukraine was also dependent on Western long range missiles - ATACMS, HIMARS, Storm Shadow/SCALP et al - so they had to respect the views of the suppliers. But things have changed here because a) Ukraine has developed its own long range strike capabilities with drones and missiles; b) The US/Israeli war against Iran, lifted constraints on Ukraine hitting Russian energy infrastructure, as it could argue if the U.S. was hitting Iran, disrupting global energy markets, in its self interest, then why not Ukraine on Russia where it’s national security interests were at stake? The gloves were taken off. And I guess with the war in Iran drawing to a close and oil prices on a downward slant again, the pressure on Ukraine not to hit Russian energy assets has reduced still further.

Second, and reiterating the strikes on St Petersburg and Moscow represented a huge PR win for Ukriane, taking the war to heart of Russia, and underlining the inability of Russian air defences, and Putin, to protect the population from attack by Ukraine.

Third, we are seeing a campaign to isolate and strangulate Crimea. The land route to Crimea has been made lethal by Ukrainian drone strikes on supply convoys. Over the weekend we saw Ukrainian drone strikes against ferries across the

Kerch strait to Crimea. And we also saw attacks on key air defence systems around the Kerch bridge. It seems only a matter of time before the Kerch bridge is taken out of service, which would leave Crimea marooned. Already it’s fuel supplies are at critical levels, and tourists are fleeing in their masses - if they can get fuel. If Putin’s original annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then first invasion of Donbas back in the same year, were all about protecting the security of Crimea and Russian forces there, well that policy has been, literally, blown to smithereens. Questions now surely are whether Ukraine will launch an assault to take Crimea back - albeit it still seems unlikely given the huge human death toll that would likely entail.

Fourth, pressure on Belarus is mounting. Zelensky over the past week read out an ultimatum to President Lukashenko - stop support for Russia’s war on Ukraine or else. Zelensky specifically mentioned the use of radars in Belarus helping Russia target sites in Ukraine, and fuel supplies from Belarus to Russia. Zelensky has warned unless this stops then Ukraine will take matters into its own hands, suggestive of military strikes. Lukashenko I think would be loathed to get into a shooting war with Ukraine as a) the Belarus military would unlikely last long, likely reluctant to fight for Lukashenko and against Ukraine; b) it could risk a domestic uprising against Lukashenko. That’s probably Zelensky’s favoured outcome. Any domestic move against Lukashenko would be a nightmare for President Putin as he would likely have to decide whether to divert troops from the war in Ukraine to counter a potential regime change scenario in Belarus. The latter would obviously be a other huge blow to the Putin regime, and will just underline the strategic disaster that the war has become, as it now risks the loss of an ally in Lukashenko, following Moscow’s loss of leverage in the South Caucasus (Armenia moving out of Russia’s orbit under Pahshinyan), the loss of Assad in Syria and Maduro in Venezuela. I wonder if Moscow would have allowed allies such as Assad and Maduro to fall had its resources not been eroded in Ukraine? I don’t think so.

Actually what might be happening in Belarus is a Ukrainian feint away from Crimea, helping divide and divert Russian military resources. And perhaps also the strikes in St Petersburg, Moscow and elsewhere deep inside Russia is also forcing Russia to commit key air defence and other resources away from Crimea. All this is leaving Crimea appear increasingly vulnerable to attack from Ukraine and unsustainable.

Perhaps here the end result from Ukraine is not a full blown Ukrainian assault on Ukraine, but a negoatiating tool to get Russia to pull back from its maximalist demand in Donbas. What does Putin crave more, Donbas or just holding onto Crimea? Crimea, as the base of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to be such a defining military objective that it forced the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then the push for a land corridor to Crimea with the full scale invasion of Ukrainein 2022. Crimea now neither has a land or a sea corridor! Crimea appears increasingly beleaguered.

Crimea seems to be the new Ukrainian focus. Watch this space, but also Belarus.