Ukraine - Kursk & US elections
The war in Ukraine has taken many turns over the past two and a half years. The invasion itself surprised many - albeit not yours truly as I had been predicting a defining war between Russia and Ukraine as far back as 2015 - and most back then expected a speedy Russian victory. As that failed to materialise, thru mid 2022, there was the surprise Ukrainian lighting push back to take back parts of Kharkhiv in the autumn of 2022. This then built optimism over the winter of a new Western funded counter offensive in the summer of 2023. Stalled western financing and resourcing, and the long wait, gave Russia ample time to build defences, and the much expected Ukrainian counteroffensive perhaps predictably then disappointed. Through the past year, as expectations of a Trump victory in US elections stalled US financing, Ukraine was pushed back on the back foot with Russia going on to war economy footings and grinding out slow territorial gains in Donbas. Optimism of a Ukrainian victory waned, and the messaging seemed to be that Ukraine would be forced into conceding territory to Russia as the price for peace, imposed eventually by a Trump presidency. Opinion polls even began to shift in Ukraine with a recent poll by NDI/KIIS suggesting 57% support in Ukraine for peace talks from the teens a year or so back - albeit with two thirds arguing that Ukraine should get back all territories occupied since 2014, and 74% rejected Russian demands for Ukraine to give up on ambitions for NATO membership. A narrative was though being built that, given Russia’s industrial might, risks to Western political (and hence economic and military support) backing for Ukraine, time was on Moscow’s side.
Ukraine’s surprise ongoing offensive in Kursk, taking Russian territory, has shaken up the above narrative. Kyiv has again demonstrated its remarkable resolve and ingenuity and ability to outthink Moscow, and in particular to ride roughshod through Putin’s red lines. Remember here that Putin, and his PR machine, was quick to warn in advance of last summer’s Ukrainian counteroffensive that Russia’s nuclear doctrine included first use/strike of nuclear weapons when the Russian motherland was threatened. The Kremlin made clear that the occupied Ukrainian provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhiya were considered to be part of that homeland, so subject to Russia’s first use of nuclear weapons. But while setting the condition, Moscow failed to carry thru with its threat. Now while there could be debate, and a grey area as to whether Kherson and Zaporizhiya fell under that nuclear umbrella, there is surely no doubt with respect to the Russian oblast of Kursk, large parts of which are now occupied by Ukrainian troops. And yet two weeks in Russia has failed to do very much in their defence. What is Putin up to?
Well, not very much, seems to be the answer, and indeed, Putin felt the need to pay his first visit in thirteen years this week to Chechnya, to see his friend and warlordKadyrov. A year back the Putin regime was on the back foot after the Prigozhin mutiny, and in the trip to Chechnya and given the affront of the Kursh incursion perhaps Putin felt the need to show his backstop of support in the form of the strongman Kadyrov. Perhaps this was a message to elites back in Moscow, and the West, of what could follow a Putin regime, if a defeat in Kursk risks a domino effect back to Moscow and the potential for regime change.
Putin’s lack of real reaction to the military affront in Kursk is rather extraordinary though. It’s shows I guess just how far stretched Russian military resources are - the inability to sustain the on-going offensive in Donbas, which is still bringing incremental but tactically significant gains, while also defending Russian sovereign territory. Putin perhaps recognised the Ukrainian ploy of trying to entice Russia to pull troops out of Ukraine to defend Mother Russia, thereby weakening and creating opportunities across front lines in Ukraine.
It seems as though Putin is biding his time, seeing the extent of the Ukrainian push in Kursk. He has temporarily ceded the advantage to Ukraine, forcing them to make the decision of pushing on further into Kursk, and then perhaps leaving their troops vulnerable then to counterattack with their lines extended, or holding put with more limited territorial gains. Putin can then hold troops in Ukraine, and continue with the steady assault therein. The message to Ukraine seems to be sure, you have taken the initiative, but what do you want to do with it?
To some extent I think both sides here are looking towards the US elections, and positioning for leverage before expected negotiations.
In taking Russian territory in Kursk, Ukraine has been clear that one of the objectives is to have leverage for negotiations to be able then to negotiate a future territorial exchange.
Ukraine has used the financial and military surge in Western support after the U.S. Congress finally signed off on the $61 billion support package for Ukraine well - I would include here also the supply, finally, of F16s to Ukraine. We are seeing the fruits of that in Kursk, but also in concentrated Ukrainian attacks in Crimea, and also on military and energy infrastructure in Russia itself.
Putin might have his land corridor to Crimea, but what use, if Ukrainian missile strikes means that Crimea is all but useless now as a base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Indeed, Russia has, in effect, lost the Battle of the Black Sea, having to relocate much of his Black Sea Fleet East to Nororissyk, and having much limited scope to deploy naval assets in the centre and Western parts of the Black Sea. Crimea and the Black Sea are now leverage points for Ukraine in future negotiations with Russia - as is the security of Russian energy infrastructure.
Putin might want to await the outcome of US elections, assuming a Trump presidency would all but gift him a win in Ukraine. But the new momentum behind the Harris presidential bid also creates considerable downside for Putin if Trump loses, and Harris doubles down on military support for Ukraine. The long game no longer looks to be a dead cert win for Putin, as Harris could well win, and even assuming a Trump victory the Ukrainians have proven that they are far from passengers in this war. With much of the $61 billion in US support still to be disbursed and a new $50 billion facility for Ukraine engineered around the interest flow from frozen Russian assets, Ukraine would still have much staying/fighting power beyond the US elections, whoever wins. And Putin would still likely struggle to impose any peace on Ukraine which was gifted by Trump. A long and still damaging war is the big risk still for Putin.
Ukraine faces the same uncertainties around US elections, which I think likely will push Kyiv towards negotiations towards year end. I think here this is the main driver behind the push into Kursk. Ukraine has taken a leaf out of Putin’s book by escalating just before talks. I guess the question is still how Putin will react to events in Kursk, and does he still have some ace card up his sleeve. I think here he is prepared to absorb the blow in Kursk in order to try and sustain momentum in Donbas still. Ultimately though I think we are going to see some negotiations likely including:
* A trade off of Ukrainian held territory now in Kursk for Russian held territory in Kherson and Zaporizhiya;
* Long term negotiations over the future of Ukrainian territory taken by Russia before February 2022, so DPR, LPR and Crimea. These likely will be long term talks, Ukraine is in no mood to cede these territories to Russia now - see poll as above. But talks over their longer term future, and particularly over Crimea will be a win for Putin, as they were ever part of the Minsk process (only relating to Donbas).
* Some kind of security guarantees for Ukraine, which could fall short of NATO membership, but would have to include Western assurances akin to those given to the state of Israel. If all this falls short of NATO membership then Ukraine should be assured that it will be given all the tools needed to defend itself against future Russian threats. EU membership perspectives will also be important to Ukraine as only thru EU membership will Ukraine be assured of a sufficiently strong domestic economy to shoulder the future burden of its own defence.
* Actually perhaps similar assurances to Russia over its use of Crimea as a naval base, and mindful of the 2009 long term lease over the use of the Sebastopol naval base. Russia said it annexed Crimea in 2014 to assure its naval base from NATO encroachment following Euromaydan. And the land corridor to Crimea was taken in February 2022 for precisely the same reason - or that was the Russian narrative. The reality though is that Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine actually resulted in Russia losing Crimea, de facto, as a military asset. Crimea is now a military liability for Russia - it is proving impossible to defend. So any deal that could again assure for Russia the use of Crimea as a naval base, and therein use of the Black Sea, would surely be of interest to Russia in any future negotiation. Ukraine has got leverage on this point.