Ukraine - Vance brings more risks than solutions

Former President Trump’s nomination of J D Vance as his running mate as VP in the forthcoming U.S. presidential election has sent shock waves across the Western alliance, and particularly Ukraine which is currently in the front line of Western liberal market democracy’s battle against authoritarianism with its war to fend off the Russian invasion.

Vance has been strident in his message that Europe has for too long free rided on the coattails of the US security umbrella. He has also questioned whether supporting Ukraine, in its war with Russia, is in U.S. interests - in his mind a distraction from the greater battle with China for global hegemony. The assumption is now that a Trump/Vance victory in US elections in November would see the new administration force Ukraine to the negotiating table with Russia, or risk seeing US support cut off. US support for Ukraine might be cut off anyway under a Trump 2.0.

See Vance’s opinion piece in the FT, and my own rebuttal, and then also a similar line from Trump supporters around the need to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

https://www.ft.com/content/3c87ef13-122f-4e78-a7af-54c75c30a91d

https://timothyash.substack.com/p/a-counter-to-jd-vance?r=ynli4

https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-russia-ukraine

Note here that the general assumption is that Vance, and the likes of Kellogg and Fleitz, would suggest a deal which freezes the front lines around the current state, with Russia offered some assurances of no further NATO enlargement East, while Ukraine might be offered certain security guarantees - or at least a commitment from the US, and it’s allies, to supply sufficient arms to Ukraine to enable it to defend itself from potential future Russian attacks. Vance et al, may well offer acceptance of Russian territorial gains in Ukraine, in exchange for a commitment for no further Russian advances, or attacks on Ukraine, and perhaps even sanctions moderation.

The fear in all this is whether Putin can be trusted to abide by any such deal. Putin has not held by numerous prior agreements, including the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and then Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 from 2014 and 2015. Note also in the run up to the full scale invasion in 2022, Putin, and his entourage, continuously stressed that they had no intention to invade Ukraine - albeit by that stage, they would say that would n’t they. Putin also now has a long track record of invading Russia’s neighbours, from Moldova (Transdniestr) to Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine (Crimea and Donbas in 2014, and then a full scale invasion in 2022). This also begs the question as to whether Putin’s full scale invasion of Ukraine was to secure only those five Ukrainian oblasts in the East, and which give him a land corridor to Crimea, and about pushing back on NATO enlargement east. I think not, as his writings suggest that Putin has a fundamental problem with the very existence of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state, which I would argue rather explains the invasion. He wants the whole of Ukraine. Hence Putin might just take any such deal, or ‘gift’ from Vance, banking territory he currently occupies, regrouping, rearming, ready to go again, and to take further territory. Ultimately the end game would be the total reconquest of Ukraine. Imagine then the ultimate endgame from Vance’s plans for peace - Russia greatly expanded, adding Ukraine’s now significant military industrial complex to that of

its own, re-armed, confident and in a mood for more territorial conquest - as thanks to Vance et al that would have proven a winning strategy. It would also send tens of millions of Ukrainians West to further destabilise Europe, and fan the flames of populism and centrifugal forces in Europe. Europe, a major ally still of the US, would be much enfeebled. And such a weakening of Europe would provide more fodder for Russia’s further enlargement. Vance will have breathed new life into the murdurous Putin regime, resurrecting Russia as a new near peer competitor with the US and China. Thank you JD.

For Ukraine any such peace deal, as currently suggested by Vance et al, would be painful to accept after two and a half years of valiant defence. Politically it might be difficult for President Zelensky to sell at home. Indeed, while a recent opinion poll by the Razumkov centre did show increased support (at 44%) for peace talks with Russia, 83% in the same poll rejected the idea of a Ukrainian military withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhe and Kherson, which has been demanded by Putin as the prior condition for talks. Ukrainians might be willing to talk but appear unwilling to accept Putin’s price for peace. Any such peace talks, and then ceasefire, might undermine political stability in Ukraine, sowing internal discord, which Putin might subsequently take advantage of to further attack and take even more territory.

Even if it bit the bullet and accepted an unpopular peace, any such peace would need to be adequately financed - Ukraine would need significant and continued financial support to ensure succesful recovery and reconstruction to underpin the economy to finance its own future defence. There is little in the Vance, et al messaging to suggest there is US appetite for this, and the experience of G7 support for Ukraine has been one of only fitful support. Is Europe willing to stump up the likely hundreds of billions of euros in reconstruction costs, likely required to ensure Ukrainian stability, to ensure it holds the line against future Russian aggression? Experience so far suggests a lack of joined up thinking by the West, and while support does eventually come, it often appears too little and too late.

Understandably the prospect of being forced into a peace deal, that falls well short of expectations, might not be that appealing to many Ukrainians. But the prospect of being starved of US support, finance and weapons, might still concentrate their minds and encourage participation in peace talks. The fact of being forced to the negotiating table by an outside power, the US, might also help Zelensky politically sell peace talks at home.

The question is does Ukraine have any alternative?

Can Ukraine fight on without US support?

US support for Ukraine since the full scale invasion has been significant. But, despite what Vance et al might think, US support for Ukraine has been eclipsed by Europe, and that of other allies. See the Kiel Institute, Ukraine tracker below, which puts US support for Ukraine since the full scale invasion to the end of April 2024, at €74 billion, as compared to €102 billion from Europe. Add in also €15 billion from other allies, and over €10 billion from various multilateral lenders, and the U.S. share of support comes in at just under 40% of the total. Given its own twenty trillion dollar plus economy, Europe could presumably cover the financial void left by the U.S. stepping back. But notable here is that the US share in military support is around one half of the €100 billion provided thru the end of April by Western allies. And herein it is not the money but the US provision in terms of key equipment and military technical assistance and support which will be very difficult to cover from other European allies. Europe simply lacks the Patriots, the HIMARS missiles, et al, to fill the gaps left by the US pulling back. I guess a question here is would a Trump administration be willing to say no if Europe and Ukraine came knocking to purchase the full list of US weaponary and munitions? Vance argues that the US simply lacks the industrial capacity to supply Ukraine, and now needs to refill stocks for its own list of priority threats, particularly those from China. But it will probably still be hard to say no to orders for tens of billions of dollars for military equipment made in Red states.

https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/

Presumably the Biden administration is already pre-positioning for the potential for a Trump win in November. I assume that much of the $61 billion in US assistance for Ukraine signed off by Congress in November will be front loaded to Ukraine. Much of the new $50 billion G7 facility for Ukraine which securitises the interest stream on frozen Russian assets could also be put on account for Ukraine to buy weapons. This will give Ukraine some buying power. It also still has $40 billion of its own foreign exchange reserves.

All this suggests that Ukraine could sustain itself well into 2025, and perhaps beyond, assuming a Trump administration cuts financing and supplies upon taking office. Ukraine could fight on for some time, in the event that any imposed peace is just too unpalatable. Europe likely would continue to support it - or at least the Brits, the Balts, the Poles and the Scandies, those that clearly understand the Russian threat. Ukraine could move onto a defensive strategy and, as events in this war have so far proved, defenders seem to have the advantage. Freed from the US constraint it could also move further to taking the fight to Russia, bombing longer range targets in Russia proper. And using the example of its victory in the Black Sea, continuing to use technology to harass and expose Russian vulnerabilities.

All that said, as Ukraine draws down on its US military munitions supplies, the risks are that its becomes more vulnerable as its air defences weaken, suffering ever larger casualties. Ultimately this might sap support for a continuation of the war.

But even assuming US support is pulled, Russia itself might also struggle itself to immediately seize the intiative. Ukraine could still bog Russia down in a long debilitating war. And Russia would still face the huge challenge of taking and occupying Ukraine, which is still a huge country. Such an occupation against a reluctant occupied population, likely showing stubborn resistance will cost Russia huge amounts still of blood and treasure which are still finite. Russia’s position in the Black Sea would remain vulnerable to Ukrainian use of maritime drones and long range missiles supplied by the likes of the UK and France, and perhaps eventually Germany and Italy.

All the above suggests that US pressure to force a early end to the war might not result in an early end. Ukraine might opt to fight on against the odds. And events of February 2022 and since have demonstrated that Ukrainians cannot be underestimated - they have still fought valiantly to hold a supposed global superpower at bay for over two and a half years. Meanwhile, the kind of peace deal which Vance et al might be thinking of imposing on Ukraine might not prove sustainable - Russia might not, indeed is unlikely to keep to the terms. Putin might just take whatever is given or conceded by Vance, on behalf of Ukraine, and push on later for more. The result will be a disaster for Ukraine, and ultimately for European security. With that in mind, Ukrainians might just prefer to fight on, to take their chances, and assume still that they can outlast Russia, that ultimately another Prigozhin style scenario might occur to bring the ultimate demise of Putin, and their saviour.