Ukraine - what everyone wants
Given that Ukraine peace talks appear to have reached something of an impasse I thought it perhaps useful to map out what all the main parties want at this stage - what are their objectives with regards to the war in Ukraine, and peace talks.
Putin & Russia - the aggressors
A good starting point given that Russia invaded Ukraine and has been the aggressor against Ukraine for a well over a decade now - even longer - perhaps dating back as far as the Orange Revolution in 2004/05 when there was already clear evidence of Russian intervention to weaken/undermine democratic forces.
Putin appeasers would perhaps view Russia’s long running aggression against Ukraine as a defensive response to Western exploitation of Moscow’s weakness since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. They would argue that the best representation of this exploitation was the Westward expansion of NATO and EU enlargement through central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics states and to prospective membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and now even Armenia. According to this narrative the West has pushed up to Russia’s borders and gobbled up its prior “sphere of influence” to make Moscow feel encircled and vulnerable. The West has not respected, or taken into account, Russia’s own defensive and strategic interests. Thus by annexing Crimea in April 2014, first intervening militarily in Donbas in the summer of 2014, and then resorting to full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the argument goes that Russia was just responding to genuine fears that the next domino to drop was Ukraine, and that it was poised to be the next state to join NATO and the EU, thereby further encircling and threatening Russia.
These have been stated as the Russian fears but they are not actually based on fact, at least when it comes to the real security threat to Russia.
First, while NATO did expand across Emerging Europe this was not out of some grandiose Western plot to encircle and eventually attack Russia. Countries like Poland, Romania, the Baltic states et al chose independently to join NATO as they saw this as the best defence against past, and fears over future, Russian aggression. They voted with their feet, arguably because of Russian failure to reassure them as to its future intentions.
Second, while NATO expanded across Emerging Europe in the years following 1989/91 and the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, in extending a collective security blanket across the region it made members feel safer and the result was much less spending on defence. NATO defence spending in Europe as a result went from 4-5% of GDP during the Cold War, to barely 2% by the time of the annexation of Crimea. The West spent the peace dividend. The last US main battle tanks had left Europe in 2013. Germany, the U.K. et at hollowed out their militaries through countless waves of defence spending cuts. Germany and the U.K. went from having several thousand main battles tanks each at the end of the Cold War to a few hundred by 2013, and even then those remaining were barely serviceable. The U.K. military has been shrunk in size to the smallest number of troops since before WW1. As is now evident NATO enlargement has resulted in a situation where Europe is barely able to defend itself, let alone having any real offensive capability to attack or invade Russia.
Third, back in 2013, Ukraine had no real desire or perspective to join NATO. Opinion polls shows single digit support for NATO membership and strong support for its then non aligned status. Key Western states - Germany and the U.S. were also luke warm then over talk of future further NATO expansion, with Germany blocking Georgia’s enthusiastic push for membership. And Ukraine’s military doctrine was still Soviet in design, shaped to counter the threat from the West not east. And Ukraine had little real military capability which Russia knew and exploited with the speedy annexation of Crimea in 2013. Ukraine had little desire, or perspective, to join NATO, had little real military capability, which Moscow knew and it was the latter - opportunity for a land grab - which ultimately drove Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasions of Ukraine. Ironically it was Russia’s aggression which changed the popular mood in Ukraine to a desire then for NATO membership but as a defensive ploy to counter actual Russian aggression.
Well you could perhaps say the fact that NATO expansion reduced its defensive, let alone its offensive, military capability was not the key point, it’s how this made Russia feel that is important. But this implies somehow that Moscow was blind to NATO’s diminished military capability, Ukraine’s all but non existent military capability by 2013, and the scant realistic prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership by 2013, or 2022. Playing the Russian ignorance card just does not stack up given the huge diplomatic and intelligence capabilities that Russia deployed across the region. Moscow absolutely knew NATO ‘s capabilities in Europe because we were open in detailing these.
Russia invaded Ukraine, not to counter the perceived NATO threat but because it could, because it perceived Ukraine and NATO to be too weak to push back against Russian aggression. Years of underinvestment in defence in Europe and Ukraine gave Russia the opportunity and it took it.
What about Russia’s claim to the five regions (Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhiya, Donetsk and Luhansk) which Trump, Witkoff et al are now parroting as key planks of Russia’s demands in peace talks and war aims?
As someone who has covered Ukraine as an analyst for its entire period since independence I have to say up until Russia’s annexation of Crimea and first invasion of Donbas on 2013, I saw scant reference in Russia to such claims and there were not significant popular movements in any of these regions to join Russia. Note at independence in 1991 all regions of Ukraine voted in a referendum to join the new independent Ukraine, and Russia accepted Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union and its territorial integrity. Russia further affirmed its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the now infamous Budapest Memorandum of 1994 where Ukraine (foolishly perhaps with hindsight) surrendered its nuclear Arsenal for these assurances. Surely at some point prior to 2013, Putin would have set out some claim to Crimea and Donbas, and prior to 2022 to Zaporizhiya and Kherson. But no, silence. True, in the run up to the full scale invasion there was talk of the need for Russia to have a land bridge to Crimea, but this seemed to be based more on a security calculus rather than some longstanding Russian territorial claim to these lands.
And note here that if Russia’s invasion was simply about stopping Ukraine’s NATO membership and claims to the five regions, only, how come the invasion of 2022 appeared full scale including an effort even to take Kyiv?
So herein I think we get to the real reason for the invasion and Russian objectives still in the war and the peace process. Usefully Putin even spelled it out in his 5,000 word essay on Ukraine released in the summer of 2021 and which was seen as the call to arms for Russian troops in the subsequent invasion. In that essay Putin makes clear that he has a problem with the very existence of Ukraine as he argues that it is a false construct and really Russians and Ukrainians are one people separated by an accident of history, the collapse of the USSR. Putin wants the reunification of Russia and Ukraine, or at the least the strategic control of Ukraine by Russia. I imagine he could accept a return to the situation in 2009-2013 where Ukraine is run by a puppet - Yanukovych - administration subservient to Russia. But for Putin the idea of an independent and succesful Ukraine is abhorrent, and he is prepared to continue to intervene, attack, invade, to ensure that an independent Ukraine is not successful. With this mindset there is no peace between Putin’s Russia and an independent Ukraine. Putin might accept a peace gift by Trump of no NATO for Ukraine, and of US, at least, de jure recognition of Russian territorial claims to the five regions, but this is not the end state for Putin, but rather a base camp before further intervention and wars to take the whole of Ukraine under his control. Putin will not be satiated until he controls the whole of Ukraine, that is his aim in war and peace talks, and so it’s a zero sum game here between Putin, Russia and Ukraine. Hard to see a compromise herein. And in peace talks Puin might accept the more limited gains as above, but he would aim for such a bad peace to be imposed on Ukraine that he would know this to be destabilising to Ukraine to the point that this might just offer him up more opportunity to attack and invade a weakened Ukraine in the future.
Trump and the US
Actually in the MAGA cult Trump world, it’s not what US strategic interests are with respect to Ukraine, but what are Trump’s personal motivations. And it is complex when it comes to Trump and Russia, and Ukraine. He has a long history with both. It seems like much of his thoughts around Russia date to his visits to the Soviet Union, and Russia, in the 1980s and later, and perhaps also his own memory from youth of the Cuban missile crisis. He seems to respect power and money above all else. He sees Russia as the great(er) power here, at least with respect to Ukraine, and he seems to cherish, or envy, the huge personal power and wealth of Putin himself. Trump seems to crave a strong personal relationship with Putin, and sees Russia, a nuclear power, as perhaps a potential future ally against China - the so called reverse Nixonian. There is also a sense that Trump still sees the world through the great power prism of the Cold War, agreeing almost with Putin that great powers should have spheres of influence. He seems to accept there the premise of Putin that weaker countries should bow down to greater powers - we can almost see that in Trump’s bullying of Canada, Denmark over Greenland, and Panama. Trump seems too willing to agree to Putin’s territorial claims now over Ukraine, or sees them somehow justified perhaps by his own desires to Greenland, Canada, Panama et al, and perhaps craves there a quid pro quo with Putin for taking territory in Ukraine. Trump himself has scars from past encounters with Ukraine, including thru his own impeachment and perhaps we saw Trump’s own desire for revenge play out then in the now infamous Oval Office encounter with President Zelensky. Trump’s instinct seems to be to sell Ukraine down the river to Russia, while also extracting near extortionate terms from Ukraine for any further support - see the Minerals deal. But Trump also seems constrained from fully selling Ukraine out to Russia by support still for Ukraine in the US Congress, amongst the US public but also in Europe, and does not want to be blamed for the collapse of Ukraine.
Trump made much of his desire for a peace in Ukraine, to avoid bloodshed, and even boasted that he could end the war in 24 hours, then 100 days. But Trump wants easy wins and assumed that a peace could be delivered simply by giving Putin everything he thought he desired. He seems to lack a real deep understanding of Putin, and seems incapable of investing time in really understanding Putin or the war in Ukraine. He is happy to take at face value whatever Putin tells him - trusting Putin, the war criminal, and serial liar, more than his own intelligence agencies and his allies. Putin tells him the war is about NATO expansion, Ukrainian arms build up, and the five regions. And Trump believes him. He fails to understand that Putin takes him as a fool, will ask and take concessions such as no NATO for Ukraine, and the five regions, but still want more, much more - all of Ukraine. Trump either does not understand this or cannot be bothered to invest real time in understanding the reality. Trump thinks his instincts are right on everything even though on this occasion he has been completely wrong on the war, and peace process. It seems from the latest Trump - Putin call that Trump is finally realising that a quick peace in Ukraine is beyond even his grasp, and seeing perhaps risks of his failure is looking to pass the buck back to Europe, and even the Vatican for peace talks. But meanwhile, it’s clear that Trump wants to get back to business as usual with Russia. He sees Putin as desperate for US investment and thinks that he can leverage opening US back up for business with Russia to his advantage. Trump wants to move on from Ukraine to doing business with Russia.
Ukraine
Ukraine understands completely what Putin’s ambitions are with respect to Ukraine - its total capitulation. And Ukrainians understand what a Russian victory means - the end of Ukraine as a sovereign state, and likely mass genocide against Ukrainians. They hence understand that they have no choice but to fight and hold out either for a victory in the war or a peace which leaves the country standing as an independent and sovereign nation able to defend itself against the inevitable future Russian aggression.
Any Ukrainian leader would be loathed to surrender any territory to Russia - because they know that it would be the thin end of the wedge, it would not satiate Putin, but just increase his appetite to take more Ukrainian territory. It would also likely mean the end of any Ukrainian politician’s career who agreed any such territory compromise. Zelensky likely knows he would face a military coup if he accepted any such compromise. Ukraine could though accept a freezing of the front lines as is, de facto accepting the status quo but in exchange for assurance of the security of territory remaining under the control of Kyiv. This security could be either through NATO membership, bilateral security guarantees or assurance of military supplies to Ukraine, sufficient that it will be able to defend itself, and enough security for the economy to function sufficiently to underpin political and social stability and its own defence. But Ukraine will not accept any peace that imposes limits on its military capability.
I think Ukraine now understands that the U.S., under Trump cannot be trusted and ultimately wants to sell Ukraine down the river to Russia. But Ukraine also understands that while Europe can provide financing to sustain the war, it still needs access to key U.S. munitions. Ukraine is hence playing along with Trump’s peace efforts so as not to be blamed for the break down of peace talks and then the pulling of remaining US military support. It is playing for time, but understanding that it might have to break with the US, if Trump tries to impose conditions that cross its red lines, including the loss of territory, or restrictions on its military capabilities. It is though buying time, drawing down US military support, building its own autonomous military capability and hoping that its European allies do the same sufficient that they can eventually help feed the gap left if the U.S. eventually walks away. Ukraine is though willing to fight on, even without US support, as it has no choice as it is in an existential fight for its survival.
Europe
The Munich Security Conference was the Eureka moment for Europe, when the penny finally dropped that it faces an existential threat from Russia, but the US security backstop is no longer there/or to be trusted. They have to build a military capability independent and autonomous from the US, but this will take time - perhaps five to ten years given the neglect of the past. And what do they do in the interim? Well first they have to be nice still to the US, and Trump in particular, even if they find him totally obnoxious, as they need the US to still sell them key munitions to fill the time gap until they reach some level of autonomous military capacity. And second, they have to hope that Ukraine holds out as long as possible, to buy them time. The nightmare for Europe is that the U.S. pulls military support for Ukraine and then Russia quickly wins the war against Ukraine, capturing its now substantial military industrial complex which the leaves an enfeebled Europe facing the two largest military industrial complexes in Europe - Russia plus Ukraine. That’s an extinction style event for Europe, the EU, European values, et al. So whatever Trump does, Europe has no choice but to still support Ukraine, and keep sanctions in place as long as possible to keep the Russian economy weak and unable to regenerate its conventional military capability which will inevitably be used in the future against Europe if it is not beaten. Europe is hence desperate to keep Ukraine in the war, as a front line defence for Europe, and if any peace is concluded it needs to ensure Ukraine is sustainable, and remains as that front line defence for Europe.
This is a comprehensive outline of where things stand both now in the near future. Thank you for this useful guide.
Thank you very much for a profound reading. I do very much agree with you. And I do hope that Europe and Ukraine can continue standing together. I sincerely hope that Ukraine will win finally.