In recent weeks various contacts stateside have asked me to comment on the state of the business environment in Russia, with the angle I think being the presumption that the Trump administration wants to open up to business with Russia, so U.S.
A very thoughtful and unsettlingly plausible analysis, Tim. What stands out to me is the potential fragmentation of the “collective West” — not just between the US and Europe, but within Europe itself if responses to a unilateral U.S. sanctions rollback diverge. For Ukraine, the implications are profound: we have long relied on transatlantic unity to sustain pressure on Russia. If that unity breaks, we’ll need Europe to hold the line, even in the face of U.S. disengagement or commercial opportunism.
The EU’s ability to maintain coherence and enforce its sanctions independently — and credibly — will be tested like never before. This isn’t just a matter of geopolitics, but also of regulatory resilience and legal clarity for international business. I hope both policymakers and investors are preparing for that contingency, rather than assuming a return to “business as usual” is sustainable or even desirable.
The U.S. lifting sanctions may trigger a legal minefield for international businesses, with inconsistent policies complicating Russia-related investments.
I’m doubtful here. Even in a normalization and lifting of sanctions (some of them having to be lifted by congress, which I think would be unlikely to happen), the Russian market isn’t the same as it used to be. Local business owners that got to keep western business assets after the exodus would have less imperative to sell back to western companies. There’s already huge competition within the market now with China and domestic players stepping in which didn’t exist as much as before (think autos and other appliances). Frankly without the war the civilian economy is anemic and the federal government will have to spend more and more on military outlays without the war, supporting veterans programs, the inefficient MIC and soldiers wages for a larger army that there isn’t a lot of space for the civilian economy anymore.
Will Russia have the capital to buy western products at scale that do not have military uses, especially if the price of oil does not rebound quickly? I would think that Europe would be hesitant to sell military use products that could be used to attack them.
A very thoughtful and unsettlingly plausible analysis, Tim. What stands out to me is the potential fragmentation of the “collective West” — not just between the US and Europe, but within Europe itself if responses to a unilateral U.S. sanctions rollback diverge. For Ukraine, the implications are profound: we have long relied on transatlantic unity to sustain pressure on Russia. If that unity breaks, we’ll need Europe to hold the line, even in the face of U.S. disengagement or commercial opportunism.
The EU’s ability to maintain coherence and enforce its sanctions independently — and credibly — will be tested like never before. This isn’t just a matter of geopolitics, but also of regulatory resilience and legal clarity for international business. I hope both policymakers and investors are preparing for that contingency, rather than assuming a return to “business as usual” is sustainable or even desirable.
The U.S. lifting sanctions may trigger a legal minefield for international businesses, with inconsistent policies complicating Russia-related investments.
I’m doubtful here. Even in a normalization and lifting of sanctions (some of them having to be lifted by congress, which I think would be unlikely to happen), the Russian market isn’t the same as it used to be. Local business owners that got to keep western business assets after the exodus would have less imperative to sell back to western companies. There’s already huge competition within the market now with China and domestic players stepping in which didn’t exist as much as before (think autos and other appliances). Frankly without the war the civilian economy is anemic and the federal government will have to spend more and more on military outlays without the war, supporting veterans programs, the inefficient MIC and soldiers wages for a larger army that there isn’t a lot of space for the civilian economy anymore.
Will Russia have the capital to buy western products at scale that do not have military uses, especially if the price of oil does not rebound quickly? I would think that Europe would be hesitant to sell military use products that could be used to attack them.