Is NATO enlargement really a threat to Russia?
NATO enlargement has cut conventional forces
Its kind of interesting that Russia feels so "threatened" by NATO enlargement, but the experience over the past 30 years is that as NATO has gone thru successive waves of enlargement, its conventional military capability has reduced/eroded.
Indeed the experience from NATO expansion has been thatNATO members appear to feel "safer in numbers" and have used this perception of greater safety to actually spend the peace dividend, or refocus defence spending away from conventional forces aimed to counter an attack from Russia to other defence spending aimed at countering other threats from global terrorism, or cyber-attacks. This has resulted in the UK cutting the size of its army to 78,000 as per the latest defence review - the lowest since WW2, Germany cutting the number of main battle tanks from 2000 in 1991 to sub-200 now, and the US only a few years ago withdrawing its last MBTs from Europe. Set against this Russia has 20,000 MBTs, 30,000+ APCs, several thousand planes, thousands of artillery pieces, et al. Net - net Russia has overwhelming conventional military superiority in Europe at this time. And Russia knows this - it knows that NATO has little offensive conventional military capability in Europe and indeed would have to quickly resort to a nuclear defence if faced by an assault from the East.
So the idea that NATO enlargement is some kind of offensive conventional military threat to Moscow is a joke - actually Russia should be promoting it as the experience has been more members, less defence spending, less conventional military capability, less military threat to Russia. And the reality is that even if Ukraine joined NATO, it then likely would feel less inclined to spend more on defence - instead, feeling un-nerved by the lack of NATO membership/support, President Zelensky this week announced investment in another 100,000 troops, to take the standing army to 350,000. It would not need to do this if it benefited from the NATO security guarantee - likely it would be cutting defence spending.
Conclusion?
Well one is left with the realisation here that NATO is not really a threat to Russia, and NATO enlargement likewise, is not a threat in the conventional sense. NATO tanks are not likely to roll on to Moscow, and even less likely if Ukraine joins NATO.
So why is Putin doing all this? Why is he escalating?
Two thoughts/conclusions here, if it is not all about NATO:
First, its about Ukraine - remember here Putin's essay written over the summer. Putin ultimately wants Ukraine, as he sees it as core to Russia's own identity and great power status. He thinks that there is this historical/Slavic brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians, and since the collapse of the USSR, then with the Orange Revolution and Euromaydan, Ukraine has now been set on a course West, away from Russia and over time risking to break this link with Russia. He feels he has to act now to stop this Western migration of Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Second, its about ideas, not arms or weapons. Putin fears the underlying driver/concept of Euromaydan which was a driver/desire by Ukrainians for European/Western values - democracy, human rights, rule of law - which is a diametrically opposed offering to Putin's power vertical - sovereign democratic - kleptocratic model. Putin just hates coloured revolutions as they provide the biggest threat to his own rule in Russia - Russian might rather like their own Euromaydan. And in this respect Ukraine is unfinished business - he lost the Orange and Euromaydan revolutions. And he wants to get revenge on those, but prove they were mistaken, and don't deliver better governance and improved living standards for populations. He believes his model is better, and he is determined for Euromaydan Ukraine to fail, ultimately. Hence he cannot help himself from constantly intervening to undermine Ukraine's development.
There is no black and white in international relations, only shades of grey. There are rights, wrongs, miscalculations, deceits, hypocrisy and downright lies on all sides.
There is much to agree with in Tim’s post but, for me, one fundamental mistake. It is the argument that Nato does not represent a threat to Russia. Tim refers to downgrading Nato military capability in eastern Europe, but that is not the point. That can be reversed. It is the perception of potential as much as actual that matters.
It is easy to understand why countries of the former soviet bloc wanted to join Nato, pre-eminently Poland and the Baltic countries. What is inexplicable is why in the 1990s the existing Nato powers were so swift to admit them. The cold war was over, the Soviet Union broken, and yet had still to be treated as the enemy. And if a country (or person) is treated as an enemy, do not be surprised if they respond as an enemy. Former bloc states join the European Union? Yes! Join Nato? No! At least, not yet. Here was a unique opportunity for reconciliation with Russia, and the West blew it! My criticism – one that makes me genuinely angry – is not that the West’s efforts in the sphere of international security failed (a possibility) but that it failed to try. Yes, offer the prospect of Nato membership – after a few years if reconciliation disappointed – but only then. (I look forward to reading Mary Serrote’s newly published book for more details. See also her article in Foreign Affairs, November/Deccember 2021)
How inconsistent the current position with Ukraine. How foolish of Ukraine to make a constitutional commitment to Nato membership when all that is happening is ‘kicking the can down the road’, the best on offer from the present Nato powers. Years ago, when working in Ukraine, I argued that non-alignment was a route for Ukraine to consider. Exploit the opportunities from being everybody’s unthreatening friend, no-one’s enemy. Its agricultural potential alone is phenomenal.
Instead, what Russia got from the cold war ‘victors’ was humiliation and cowboy capitalism. From the information we have, Putin was led a merry dance by Nato powers negotiating what Russia’s relationship with the institution might be – an institution which, incidentally, had lost its prime purpose and had to find a new role. I have no time for Putin and abhor the bad things happening in Russia today, and indeed eastern Ukraine, but it is easy to see that the experience played right into his hands, surely firing part of his attitude in today’s crisis. In part, Putin is a consequence of the West’s past errors.
In short, “as ye sow, so shall ye reap.” It’s as well to remember that, on all sides.