There is no black and white in international relations, only shades of grey. There are rights, wrongs, miscalculations, deceits, hypocrisy and downright lies on all sides.
There is much to agree with in Tim’s post but, for me, one fundamental mistake. It is the argument that Nato does not represent a threat to Russia. Tim refers to downgrading Nato military capability in eastern Europe, but that is not the point. That can be reversed. It is the perception of potential as much as actual that matters.
It is easy to understand why countries of the former soviet bloc wanted to join Nato, pre-eminently Poland and the Baltic countries. What is inexplicable is why in the 1990s the existing Nato powers were so swift to admit them. The cold war was over, the Soviet Union broken, and yet had still to be treated as the enemy. And if a country (or person) is treated as an enemy, do not be surprised if they respond as an enemy. Former bloc states join the European Union? Yes! Join Nato? No! At least, not yet. Here was a unique opportunity for reconciliation with Russia, and the West blew it! My criticism – one that makes me genuinely angry – is not that the West’s efforts in the sphere of international security failed (a possibility) but that it failed to try. Yes, offer the prospect of Nato membership – after a few years if reconciliation disappointed – but only then. (I look forward to reading Mary Serrote’s newly published book for more details. See also her article in Foreign Affairs, November/Deccember 2021)
How inconsistent the current position with Ukraine. How foolish of Ukraine to make a constitutional commitment to Nato membership when all that is happening is ‘kicking the can down the road’, the best on offer from the present Nato powers. Years ago, when working in Ukraine, I argued that non-alignment was a route for Ukraine to consider. Exploit the opportunities from being everybody’s unthreatening friend, no-one’s enemy. Its agricultural potential alone is phenomenal.
Instead, what Russia got from the cold war ‘victors’ was humiliation and cowboy capitalism. From the information we have, Putin was led a merry dance by Nato powers negotiating what Russia’s relationship with the institution might be – an institution which, incidentally, had lost its prime purpose and had to find a new role. I have no time for Putin and abhor the bad things happening in Russia today, and indeed eastern Ukraine, but it is easy to see that the experience played right into his hands, surely firing part of his attitude in today’s crisis. In part, Putin is a consequence of the West’s past errors.
In short, “as ye sow, so shall ye reap.” It’s as well to remember that, on all sides.
Unfortunately I think this is not about security for Putin, or NATO, but about Ukraine. He has a fundamental problem with Ukraine’s very existence and with the collapse of the USSR. Why would he bother to write a long essay about Ukraine over the summer, and distribute it to every member of the Russian armed forces? And remember here that Ukraine had zero interest in joining NATO in 2014, with single digit popular support for membership, it had almost no military capability as referenced by how quickly Crimea was annexed and then the follow up military defeats in Debeltseva and Illovaisk, plus it’s military doctrine was anti Western, not anti Russian. And despite all that, it got invaded and annexed. Similar fates had befallen Moldova and Georgia before.
Now I agree mistakes were made in managing the post Soviet transition. But remember that the West held open arms to Russia, providing billions in cheap loans and technical assistance. This was not the behaviour of an adversary. And there is no evidence to support the uban myth/alternative facts that Russia was promised no further NATO enlargement by the then US Secretary of State Baker. Even former President Gorbachev has attested to this fact.
The problem here is not NATO, neither Russia or Ukraine, but Putin and his imperial ambitions.
Tim, there are so many dimensions to the conflict that merit discussion. I take your points about it being fundamentally about Ukraine and Putin’s attitude to the collapse of the USSR. I also concede that, as they say, we are where we are and can’t change mistakes of the past. Recalling where I began in my first comments, and specifically about the wisdom or otherwise of how NATO moved eastwards in Europe, I refer again to Sarotte’s detailed research on the subject. In common with her book ‘1989 .....’, sometimes I find her style so dense on detail that it’s possible to lose sight of the overarching aspects. But that’s my problem and a backhanded compliment to her because the detail reflects her meticulous research and scholarship. Having read the first 100 pages of her ‘Not One Inch’ newly published book, I found I needed to go back to her summary article in Foreign Affairs to get the overall picture. But all I find is hard evidence for my initial conclusion about the error of extending the geographical scope of NATO as it was. The Partners for Peace gradualist approach was quietly abandoned, which at least lent scope for more measured inclusion of countries making their sovereign choices. But it helped if such choices were consistent with American security policy. I can’t do justice to all the evidence and arguments here, but would invite anyone interested in our exchanges to look at Sarotte for themselves.
Changing tack slightly, I never thought my respect for our UK parliamentarians would be reduced largely to Conservative MPs with military backgrounds. Tobias Elwood is a case in point. NATO countries are limited in what they can do because Ukraine is not a member, so Putin knows that he commands a military might that will confront a better armed and trained Ukrainian force thus offering the prospect of a prolonged and extremely nasty war. So, in a sense Ukraine is alone in nomansland, something that could have been avoided had the course and direction of NATO expansion been more widely and carefully considered - or constrained - in the 1990s. That it was not feeds Putin’s narrative. Moreover, if (if only!) Putin did not exist, it is not difficult to understand why many Russians would not anyway suspect and mistrust NATO countries’ objectives ( for which read led by the USA) unless Russia was seen as a permanent threat. The 1990s were suppose to end that, but I’m not convinced that Cold War attitudes ever were abandoned, more likely briefly suspended.
All that pales into insignificance relative to the imminent threat to the lives of Ukrainian people, especially those we know and care about personally. Every news bulletin brings a more heightened sense of acute anxiety about them. If only it were possible to feel more optimistic about how this crisis will end.
Thanks again Keith, I find it strange that we all have to feel sorry for Russia and Putin for feeling “threatened” by NATO enlargement. But let’s not forget that those new NATO entrants since 97’ all chose to do so on their own free wills. No demonstrations against. They chose to do so as they felt threatened by Russia. And NATO has not invaded any countries and remained without good reason - sure you could say Kosovo or BIH but that was to stop ethnic cleansing, and arguably should have happened earlier. Meanwhile, Russian troops have invaded uninvited, and remained, in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. We could add Wagner mercenaries in Mali, Libya and Syria, the latter alongside regular Russian troops. They have sited Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and have 200,000 troops now surrounding and threatening Ukraine. Who really is the aggressor here? Who is feeling threatened.
And you mention the NATO threat to Russia. Most Russians don’t care about NATO unless scared by the relentless state run media assault. And it does not stop Russian oligarchs and elites parking their cash, buying properties and educating their kids in NATO members. Strange behavior surely if they were so “threatened” to be so eager to live, educate and invest in NATO countries.
There is no black and white in international relations, only shades of grey. There are rights, wrongs, miscalculations, deceits, hypocrisy and downright lies on all sides.
There is much to agree with in Tim’s post but, for me, one fundamental mistake. It is the argument that Nato does not represent a threat to Russia. Tim refers to downgrading Nato military capability in eastern Europe, but that is not the point. That can be reversed. It is the perception of potential as much as actual that matters.
It is easy to understand why countries of the former soviet bloc wanted to join Nato, pre-eminently Poland and the Baltic countries. What is inexplicable is why in the 1990s the existing Nato powers were so swift to admit them. The cold war was over, the Soviet Union broken, and yet had still to be treated as the enemy. And if a country (or person) is treated as an enemy, do not be surprised if they respond as an enemy. Former bloc states join the European Union? Yes! Join Nato? No! At least, not yet. Here was a unique opportunity for reconciliation with Russia, and the West blew it! My criticism – one that makes me genuinely angry – is not that the West’s efforts in the sphere of international security failed (a possibility) but that it failed to try. Yes, offer the prospect of Nato membership – after a few years if reconciliation disappointed – but only then. (I look forward to reading Mary Serrote’s newly published book for more details. See also her article in Foreign Affairs, November/Deccember 2021)
How inconsistent the current position with Ukraine. How foolish of Ukraine to make a constitutional commitment to Nato membership when all that is happening is ‘kicking the can down the road’, the best on offer from the present Nato powers. Years ago, when working in Ukraine, I argued that non-alignment was a route for Ukraine to consider. Exploit the opportunities from being everybody’s unthreatening friend, no-one’s enemy. Its agricultural potential alone is phenomenal.
Instead, what Russia got from the cold war ‘victors’ was humiliation and cowboy capitalism. From the information we have, Putin was led a merry dance by Nato powers negotiating what Russia’s relationship with the institution might be – an institution which, incidentally, had lost its prime purpose and had to find a new role. I have no time for Putin and abhor the bad things happening in Russia today, and indeed eastern Ukraine, but it is easy to see that the experience played right into his hands, surely firing part of his attitude in today’s crisis. In part, Putin is a consequence of the West’s past errors.
In short, “as ye sow, so shall ye reap.” It’s as well to remember that, on all sides.
Thanks Keith, I appreciate the feedback, as ever.
Unfortunately I think this is not about security for Putin, or NATO, but about Ukraine. He has a fundamental problem with Ukraine’s very existence and with the collapse of the USSR. Why would he bother to write a long essay about Ukraine over the summer, and distribute it to every member of the Russian armed forces? And remember here that Ukraine had zero interest in joining NATO in 2014, with single digit popular support for membership, it had almost no military capability as referenced by how quickly Crimea was annexed and then the follow up military defeats in Debeltseva and Illovaisk, plus it’s military doctrine was anti Western, not anti Russian. And despite all that, it got invaded and annexed. Similar fates had befallen Moldova and Georgia before.
Now I agree mistakes were made in managing the post Soviet transition. But remember that the West held open arms to Russia, providing billions in cheap loans and technical assistance. This was not the behaviour of an adversary. And there is no evidence to support the uban myth/alternative facts that Russia was promised no further NATO enlargement by the then US Secretary of State Baker. Even former President Gorbachev has attested to this fact.
The problem here is not NATO, neither Russia or Ukraine, but Putin and his imperial ambitions.
Tim, there are so many dimensions to the conflict that merit discussion. I take your points about it being fundamentally about Ukraine and Putin’s attitude to the collapse of the USSR. I also concede that, as they say, we are where we are and can’t change mistakes of the past. Recalling where I began in my first comments, and specifically about the wisdom or otherwise of how NATO moved eastwards in Europe, I refer again to Sarotte’s detailed research on the subject. In common with her book ‘1989 .....’, sometimes I find her style so dense on detail that it’s possible to lose sight of the overarching aspects. But that’s my problem and a backhanded compliment to her because the detail reflects her meticulous research and scholarship. Having read the first 100 pages of her ‘Not One Inch’ newly published book, I found I needed to go back to her summary article in Foreign Affairs to get the overall picture. But all I find is hard evidence for my initial conclusion about the error of extending the geographical scope of NATO as it was. The Partners for Peace gradualist approach was quietly abandoned, which at least lent scope for more measured inclusion of countries making their sovereign choices. But it helped if such choices were consistent with American security policy. I can’t do justice to all the evidence and arguments here, but would invite anyone interested in our exchanges to look at Sarotte for themselves.
Changing tack slightly, I never thought my respect for our UK parliamentarians would be reduced largely to Conservative MPs with military backgrounds. Tobias Elwood is a case in point. NATO countries are limited in what they can do because Ukraine is not a member, so Putin knows that he commands a military might that will confront a better armed and trained Ukrainian force thus offering the prospect of a prolonged and extremely nasty war. So, in a sense Ukraine is alone in nomansland, something that could have been avoided had the course and direction of NATO expansion been more widely and carefully considered - or constrained - in the 1990s. That it was not feeds Putin’s narrative. Moreover, if (if only!) Putin did not exist, it is not difficult to understand why many Russians would not anyway suspect and mistrust NATO countries’ objectives ( for which read led by the USA) unless Russia was seen as a permanent threat. The 1990s were suppose to end that, but I’m not convinced that Cold War attitudes ever were abandoned, more likely briefly suspended.
All that pales into insignificance relative to the imminent threat to the lives of Ukrainian people, especially those we know and care about personally. Every news bulletin brings a more heightened sense of acute anxiety about them. If only it were possible to feel more optimistic about how this crisis will end.
Thanks again Keith, I find it strange that we all have to feel sorry for Russia and Putin for feeling “threatened” by NATO enlargement. But let’s not forget that those new NATO entrants since 97’ all chose to do so on their own free wills. No demonstrations against. They chose to do so as they felt threatened by Russia. And NATO has not invaded any countries and remained without good reason - sure you could say Kosovo or BIH but that was to stop ethnic cleansing, and arguably should have happened earlier. Meanwhile, Russian troops have invaded uninvited, and remained, in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. We could add Wagner mercenaries in Mali, Libya and Syria, the latter alongside regular Russian troops. They have sited Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and have 200,000 troops now surrounding and threatening Ukraine. Who really is the aggressor here? Who is feeling threatened.
And you mention the NATO threat to Russia. Most Russians don’t care about NATO unless scared by the relentless state run media assault. And it does not stop Russian oligarchs and elites parking their cash, buying properties and educating their kids in NATO members. Strange behavior surely if they were so “threatened” to be so eager to live, educate and invest in NATO countries.