Russia is struggling to defend its foothold in the South Caucasus
News is filtering through of an Armenia - Azerbaijan - Türkiye deal over the Zangezur corridor - this follows the visit of Armenian PM Pashinyan to Türkiye earlier this week.
A few conclusions herein:
First, it augurs well for a final Armenia - Azerbaijan peace deal, to finally close off the decades long disputes over Nagornyi Karabakh, and offers the potential for the opening of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Türkiye. That’s a huge potential trade and transit win for all three, opening the way from Central Asia to Europe, though these three states.
Second, for Türkiye any deal with Armenia would further help ease relations with Europe, and the US, which had been strained by lobbying from the Armenian diaspora over related issues.
Third, this is another huge defeat for Russia, and I would argue a consequence of its disastrous war on Ukraine. Because Russia has been bogged down in the war in Ukraine it has been unable to use military force to defend its interests in the South Caucasus. This means that when Azerbaijan, supported by Turkish military and technology supplies, launched its latest offensive in Nagornyi Karabakh in 2023, Russia was unable to honour its security commitments to Armenia, and the result was an overwhelming victory by Azerbaijan. Armenian PM Pashinyan is now having to live with the consequences of that, and signing a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and normalising relations with Türkiye, is just part of that process.
Seeing Russian influence waning, Pashinyan has sought to normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye and deepen ties with Europe (particularly France) as he seeks to pull Armenia finally out of the Russian orbit. Russia has tried to stall this process by intervening in Armenia politics to try and undermine and weaken Pashinyan - there have recently been reports of coup efforts against Pashinyan, supported by Russia.
Azerbaijan has been resisting a final peace deal until changes are made in the Armenian constitution, affirming Baku’s control over NK. This has been difficult for Pashinyan given his poll ratings are lagging and he faces elections. He has been stalling making these concessions until after elections. However, the concession to Azerbaijan and Türkiye now over the Zangezur corridor might see Azerbaijan also offer concessions on these same constitutional demands. This might allow for a final peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be signed very shortly. Pashinyan hopes that any economic windfall benefits from the opening of borders and improved visa rights for Armenians to Europe will eventually bring him salvation in elections.
Russia is now seeing both Armenia and Azerbaijan pull out of its orbit, towards Europe and Türkiye, and is obviously unhappy. Recent attacks/arrests on/of Azeris in Russia might be part of Moscow’s efforts to retaliate against Baku. Baku has shown it is not going to be pushed around, however, as reflected in the recent detentions made at Russia’s Sputnik officers in Baku. The gloves are off from both sides. I doubt Moscow would seek a direct military confrontation with Baku though as a) the Azerbaijan military has shown that it is capable force in recent wars in NK; b) Any Russian attack on Azerbaijan would risk a war with Türkiye; c) The Russian military is already stretched in Ukraine.
The irony now though is that while Armenia and Azerbaijan move out of Russia’s orbit, neighbouring Georgia, once the darling of the West, has been pulled back towards Moscow, by the Russia leaning Georgia Dream/Ivanishvili administration. Pro Western demonstrations are still on-going there, albeit met by arrests and forced from the incumbent regime. Georgia is still in play, in terms of the pull-push between Russia and the West. A further complication there is the involvement of China though its bid to run the Anaklia port. The latter has annoyed the Trump administration which is still supporting efforts in the U.S. Congress to sanction the Ivanishvili regime, even though it fits into the populist, far right families values Trump world of Victor Orban, Robert Fico et al.
Fourth, and finally, Azerbaijan and Türkiye’s push on the Zangezur corridor is also using the opportunity provided by the weakness of Iran following recent U.S./Isrseli attacks. Hitherto Iran had opposed the opening of the Zangezur corridor.
Wow, strong breakdown. The way Turkiye, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are repositioning themselves shows how fast regional order can shift when the old guard is distracted. Putin’s deterrent is done — he couldnt stop Aliyev in 2023, and he’s barely keeping Pashinyan in his orbit now. The CSTO means nothing. Macron steps in, and Yerevan leans West. Erdogan’s playing this perfectly — normalizing with Armenia, building the Zangezur corridor, and anchoring Türkiye as the bridge from Central Asia to Europe. Baku’s military confidence and Ankara’s timing reshaped the map without firing at NATO — that’s leverage. And Iran? Too busy absorbing Israeli and U.S. strikes to stop it. A year ago they opposed Zangezur. Now they’re sidelined by drones, protests, and quiet panic inside the IRGC. But here’s what I keep coming back to: We’re not just watching new players rise — we’re watching the old order crack. The globalist framework is fracturing—IMF, UN, NATO, even the EU. Everyone sees it. But at the same time, globalism is flexing harder than ever. Not in spite of the chaos—but through it. ESG, digital IDs, global climate rules, AI treaties—they’re all being accelerated. Why? Because more conflict means more justification for central control. And that’s the goal. The vacuum isn’t accidental. It’s useful. I dont we’re not in a vacuum. We’re in transition. From unipolar dominance → to multipolar disorder → toward something more… consolidated. Feels like the world’s splitting into camps—but I wonder if thats just the prelude to a new kind of centralization that hasn’t fully revealed itself yet.
You are spot on that the world is fractioning, but i think the main cause of that are unsustainable and growing wealth gaps in many places across the globe. The obvious 2 way to tackle them are either i) higher taxes (incl. wealth / inheritance) or ii) more (authoritarian) control. Most visible this of course is in the UK and US.
But for hybrid authoritarian regimes with patronage (HARP) it’s both a threat (seizing / taxing their assets in the West) and opportunity (regroup among similar HARP states led by China, BRICS) and they tend to gravitate to each other.
Georgia is prime example of this: GDP per capita almost 2x over last 4 years but clearly this growth was not widely inclusive, so following failed popular revolt comes authoritarian turn more in favour of China (deep-see port, balancing Russia) vs EU (disillusionment after russian invasion into Ukraine, limited economic benefits despite FTA). The irony is that russia will be willing to pay now for Georgia as it loses both Armenia & Azerbaijan